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Civil Society and International Organizations:  A Liberal 
Framework for Global Governance 
 
FRANCESCA BIGNAMI 
 
Abstract 
 Over the past decade, international economic organizations have come under 
attack as illegitimate and oppressive.  The remedy, according to the critics, is civil society:  
non-state associations should have a right to participate in the policymaking activities of 
international organizations.  But the  moral grounds for giving civil society such a 
central role in global governance, together with the ramifications of those moral grounds 
for organizational reform in the international arena, have not yet been systematically 
analyzed.  Why are associations outside the state better placed than trained, career civil 
servants and elected politicians to decide on international aid, the regulatory pre-
requisites for free trade, and other issues of global governance?  And even though we 
might all agree that associations outside the state have something to contribute to the 
work of international elites, what, precisely, should be their role?  Writing press articles, 
lobbying, commenting on policymaking proposals, voting on committees, or suing in 
international tribunals?   
 This paper explores the contribution that the political philosophy and empirical 
practice of liberal democracy can make to this set of questions.  Liberal theorists have 
made four different types of claims for how civil society contributes to the good life, each 
of which generates a different understanding of the  associations that count as “civil 
society” and the policy initiatives that should be undertaken in favor of civil society.  
Equipped with these insights, the organizational reforms under way in the international 
realm are evaluated.  However, the literature review also demonstrates, somewhat 
surprisingly, that the political theorists and the civil society activists are talking past one 
another:  the theory does not address directly the question of whether associations should 
take part in democratic governance.  For the theory, the democratic value of civil society 
lies in collective life outside the state.  Therefore, the paper turns to the practice of 
contemporary democracies.  Comparative law shows that private associations can 
participate in public life in at least three different ways:  pluralism, corporatism, and 
republicanism.  In pluralism, multiple, competing interest groups have numerous 
opportunities to influence policymaking, irrespective of their size or aims, through the 
legislature, the bureaucracy, and the courts.  In corporatism, certain intermediate 
organizations are afforded a special role in policymaking because they are believed to 
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represent significant social and economic forces.   In republicanism, citizen associations 
engage in the public life of the nation through debate and protest, but enjoy relatively few 
opportunities to influence legislators, bureaucrats, and judges.  In light of the ideals 
underpinning these different cultures of democracy and the empirics of the international 
realm, the paper concludes that the  law of corporatism is the most appropriate for some of 
today’s international organizations.   
 
 Over the past two decades, a combination of social movement activists, 
academics, and developing countries have mounted a formidable critique of 
international economic organizations.  The bill of particulars is by now familiar 
to most observers:  the neo-liberal formula of open markets, export-oriented 
economic growth, low budget deficits, minimal state intervention in the 
economy, deregulation, and privatization had proved a disaster for most of the 
developing countries to which it had been applied.1  The damage, while 
particularly acute in the developing world, was not limited to that realm.  The 
critics have argued that even democracies in the western world have suffered at 
the hands of international organizations. Allegedly, such organizations sacrificed 
domestic concern for social and economic inequalities and environmental 
protection to the false regulatory imperatives of the global market.  
 The critique was accompanied by a call for greater participation, within 
international organizations, of civil society.2  For some, civil society means all 
associations between the state and the market.  For the most disapproving voices, 
however, civil society includes only social and environmental non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) that strive to improve material conditions for the world's 
poor and to protect the environment, not economic interest groups.  The remedy 
is to curb the broad powers exercised by national ministers, international 
bureaucrats, and multinational corporations with the right of civil society to 
participate in the decisionmaking of global institutions. 
 Civil society advocates have already triggered a host of reforms of 
international organizations.  A number of other reforms have been proposed but 
not yet implemented.  Yet the justification for such far-reaching change, apart 
from the impulse to replace the present, state-centered configuration of 
international organizations with something different, is unclear.  Why are 
associations outside the state better placed than trained, career civil servants and 
elected politicians to decide on foreign aid, regulatory pre-requisites for free 
trade, measures necessary to protect the environment, and other, pressing issues 
of global governance?  And even though we might all agree that associations 
outside the state have something to contribute to the work of civil servants and 
elected politicians, what, precisely, should be their role?  If the principal 
contribution of non-state associations is rallying the citizens of the world on 
                                                 
1 RICHARD PEET, UNHOLY TRINITY:  THE IMF, WORLD BANK AND WTO 14 (2003). 
2 Miles Kahler, Global Governance Redefined, WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 33 (forthcoming 2005).    
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international issues so citizens may hold their governments accountable, the 
decisions of international organizations simply need to be visible to such 
associations and their members.  In other words, all that is needed is greater 
transparency.  But maybe--as most activists argue--non-state associations should 
also have certain, express rights to participate in the day-to-day decisions of 
international lawmaking bodies, bureaucracies, and tribunals.  This paper seeks 
to fill the theoretical lacuna by exploring what the political theory of civil society 
and the comparative law of democracy can contribute to redesigning global 
institutions.  
The first part of this paper sets the stage by exposing the breadth of the 
civil society phenomenon in three different international organizations: the 
World Bank, the World Trade Organization, and the European Union.  Part Two 
puts forward the moral principle that serves as the basis for the constructive 
project:  liberal democracy.  The next part provides some historical background 
on the concept of civil society.  Part Four critically examines the four dominant 
political theories of citizen associations and their contribution to the good life in 
democratic societies.  These theories serve as the basis for evaluating the pro-civil 
society reforms that have been made to date in international organizations and 
for suggesting other institutional innovations.  The review of the literature also 
demonstrates, somewhat surprisingly, that the political philosophers and the 
civil society activists are talking past one another: the theory does not address 
head-on the question of whether associations should take part in public 
decisionmaking.  For civil society theory, the democratizing potential of civil 
society lies in collective life outside the state.   Thus, Part Five explores the 
comparative law of contemporary democracies and shows that interest and 
identity groups can participate in public life in at least three different ways: 
pluralism, corporatism, and republicanism.   The concluding section returns to 
the institutional reform of international organizations.  In view of the premises 
and ideals that inform different cultures of democracy and the realities of politics 
in the international realm, I argue that the public law of corporatism is the most 
appropriate for today's international organizations.   
Civil Society Reforms 
 This section canvasses some of the recent initiatives to redesign 
international organizations in favor of civil society--defined as all interest and 
identity associations outside the state.3  The purpose is not to provide an 
                                                 
3 This is a working definition for purposes of this paper.  International organizations, governments, 
activists, and, as we shall see, political theorists, all define the term "civil society" differently.  While 
the World Trade Organization and the European Union adopt the broad definition used here, the 
World Bank's definition is narrower:  the Bank excludes associations that further the market-related 
activities of their members.  According to the Bank's website, civil society “[refers] to the wide 
array of non-governmental and not-for-profit organizations that have a presence in public life, 
expressing the interests and values of their members or others, based on ethical, cultural, political, 
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exhaustive description but rather to bring to light the scope of the civil society 
phenomenon and the importance of developing a theoretical framework that can 
assist in evaluating current and future attempts at institutional innovation.  
 The World Bank 
 The World Bank is widely regarded as having made some of the most far-
reaching reforms to accommodate civil society.4  These innovations have 
transformed the Bank's policymaking, its implementation-review process, and its 
funding programs.  As will be explained in the political theory section, most of 
these reforms find their roots in the communitarian and social capital lines of 
analysis.  Namely, the theory is that giving local groups decisionmaking power 
will encourage the civic responsibility critical to democratization and will 
promote community values. 
 The Bank's most significant policymaking instruments are loans:  loans 
for specific development projects and structural adjustment loans, linked to 
economic reforms such as exchange rate stability, low inflation, and privatization 
of state-owned sectors of the economy.  Since the mid-1990s, the Bank has 
required government recipients of project loans to seek the advice of local 
residents and local NGOs on relocation plans, environmental protection, and 
other matters.5  As for structural adjustment loans, in 1997, the Bank organized a 
major consultation exercise involving civil society and governments to evaluate 
the impact of such loans in seven recipient countries (Ghana, Uganda, 
Zimbabwe, Ecuador, El Salvador, Bangladesh and Hungary). The five-year 
exercise, called the Structural Adjustment Participatory Review Initiative 
(SAPRI), was conceived both as a vehicle for studying the effect of these loans on 
a number of welfare indices and as a general examination of “how the 
participation of local, broad-based civil society can improve economic 
policymaking.”6  
                                                                                                                                     
scientific, religious or philanthropic considerations.” See 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/CSO/0,,contentMDK%3A20101499~menu
PK%3A244752~pagePK%3A220503~piPK%3A220476~theSitePK%3A228717,00.html. 
4 See PEET, UNHOLY TRINITY, supra note__ at 134; Kumi Naidoo, Civil society, governance and 
globalisation: The World Bank and civil society, 3 TRANSNAT’L ASS’NS 173, 179 (2003). 
5 See Sabine Schlemmer-Schulte, The Impact of Civil Society on the World Bank, the International 
Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization: The Case of the World Bank, 7 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. 
L. 399, 404 (2001).   
6 SAPRI, Project Description of the SAPRI, available at 
http://www.worldbank.org/research/sapri/saprdescnew.htm.  Unfortunately, SAPRI did not have a 
happy ending.  After the Bank published its findings in July 2001, the NGOs involved in SAPRI 
issued their own, overwhelmingly negative report, criticizing the overall effect of structural 
adjustment loans on developing countries and accusing the Bank of having failed to address their 
concerns. SAPRIN, THE POLICY ROOTS OF ECONOMIC CRISIS AND POVERTY (2002), available at 
www.saprin.org/SAPRI_Findings.pdf.  Despite the attempts to resolve the dispute, the Bank-
sponsored process collapsed. See PEET, UNHOLY TRINITY, supra note __ at 144; see also SAPRIN, Letter 
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 The Bank’s most recent efforts to involve civil society in policymaking 
have centered on Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs).  These country-
specific papers present an overview of the country’s economic policies, 
development programs, and external financing needs; the goal is to generate a 
comprehensive, country-based strategy for poverty reduction.7  PRSPs aim “to 
provide the crucial link between national public actions, donor support, and the 
development outcomes.”8  They are drafted jointly by government officials, local 
World Bank officials, private sector actors, and NGOs.9  Notwithstanding some 
criticism of national consultation procedures,  PRSPs represent a dramatic 
change from the earlier practice of closed, bilateral talks between World Bank 
officials and recipient governments.10   
 NGOs can also influence the implementation-review phase.11  In 1994, the 
Bank created an Inspection Panel to investigate complaints that World Bank 
officials responsible for project loans had infringed the Bank's procedures and 
rules.  The multi-national, three-member Panel is appointed by the Board of 
Governors (composed of representatives of the member states) after consultation 
with the Executive Directors of the Bank (the principal governing body 
responsible for the day-to-day activities of the Bank) and with civil society.12  
More significant than civil society consultation in the appointments process, is 
the right of local NGOs to bring complaints to the Inspection Panel.  In the 
absence of local NGOs willing to file such claims, international NGOs are 
permitted to do so. 
 In addition to allowing participation in loan decisions and 
implementation review, the Bank uses funding to promote civil society in 
developing countries.  Through the Small Grants Program, the Bank's country 
offices distribute grants to local NGOs.  These grants are for initiatives in areas 
such as the environment, micro-credit, post-conflict reconstruction, information 
technology, human rights, gender equality, and small-enterprise development.13  
According to the official line, the Program is aimed at “promoting dialogue, 
disseminating information for the empowerment of marginalized and vulnerable 
groups, and … enhancing partnerships with key players in support of the 
development process.”14  The World Bank's new-found commitment to civil 
                                                                                                                                     
from SAPRIN Global Steering Committee to President Wolfensohn (April 10, 2004), available at 
http://www.saprin.org/SAPRIN_Wolfensohn_16April04.PDF. 
7 See IMF, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/prsp.htm. 
8 Id.  
9 Id.  
10 See Naidoo, Civil society, governance and globalisation, supra note__ at 180. 
11 See Schlemmer-Schulte, The Impact of Civil Society, supra note__ at 405.   
12 See IBRAHIM F. I. SHIHATA, THE WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL:  IN PRACTICE 89-90 (2000). 
13 Id.  
14 See World Bank, Small Grants Program, available at 
http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/ESSD/sdvext.nsf/64ByDocName/SmallGrants. 
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society participation is also reflected in various changes in administrative 
structure.15  
 The World Trade Organization 
 The WTO has done far less to open its decisionmaking to civil society. 16   
Rather, greater transparency is the main achievement of the past decade.  
According to General Council guidelines, WTO documents are to be publicly 
available through an electronic, on-line data base. 17 And, in practice, it appears 
that WTO documents--from Ministerials, General Council meetings, dispute 
resolution proceedings, and the numerous, specialized committees that deal with 
individual trade agreements and policy areas--have become widely available.18   
 Civil society consultation has been much slower in the making.  Member 
countries have been extremely reluctant to allow civil society groups to interfere 
with their control over WTO policy.  Members still conceive of the organization 
as based exclusively on state sovereignty and as entirely intergovernmental: 
Members have pointed to the special character of the WTO, which 
is both a legally binding intergovernmental treaty of rights and 
obligations among its Members and a forum for negotiations.  As 
a result of extensive discussions, there is currently a broadly held 
view that it would not be possible for NGOs to be directly 
involved in the work of the WTO or its meetings.  Closer 
consultation and cooperation with NGOs can also be met 
constructively through appropriate processes at the national level 
where lies primary reponsibility for taking into account the 
different elements of public interest which are brought to bear on 
trade policy-making.19 
                                                 
15 This entails Civil Society Staff in the Bank's country offices and a Civil Society Group and a Civil Society 
Team at the Bank's Washington, D.C. headquarters.  All are responsible for promoting NGO participation in 
Bank programs. See World Bank, World Bank Staff Working With Civil Society, available at 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/CSO/0,,contentMDK:20093777~menuPK:2
20425~pagePK:220503~piPK:220476~theSitePK:228717,00.html. 
16 The WTO defines "civil society" more broadly than does the World Bank:  "Environmental 
groups, organised labour, commercial farmers and various other business lobby groups in fact all 
qualify for NGO status as long as they prove an interest in trade-related issues.  According to one 
WTO official, 'Microsoft would not be allowed to attend but its industry group would be.'"  
Mattner, Understanding NGO participation in the WTO, supra note__ at 136. 
17 Decision adopted by the General Council on 18 July 1996, Guidelines for arrangements on relations 
with Non-Governmental Organizations, WT/L/162, 23 July 1996; see also Decision adopted by the 
General Council on 14 May 2002, Procedures for the circulation and derestriction of WTO documents, 
WT/L/452, 16 May 2002 (deciding that all WTO official documents should be unrestricted and 
available to the public through WTO website).  
18 See Mark Mattner, Understanding NGO participation in the WTO: history, nature and implications for 
developing countries, 3 TRANSNAT’L ASS’NS 132, 134 (2003).  
19 Id. at para. VI. 
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 Civil society has been granted only two, limited avenues to participate in 
WTO decisionmaking.  First, NGOs may send representatives to Ministerial 
Conferences.  Beforehand, they must be accredited by the WTO Secretariat.  The 
criteria, however, are not particularly demanding; the Secretariat has granted 
about 98% of all applications to date.20  The number of accredited NGOs has 
grown exponentially since the practice first began--from 156 organizations in 
1996 for the Singapore Ministerial Conference to 966 in 2003 for the Cancún 
Ministerial.21  At Ministerials, NGOs are provided with meeting rooms and are 
debriefed by the WTO Secretariat on the progress of the informal working 
sessions of the Member States. 22  Presumably, by following the negotiations, civil 
society groups can exert greater influence.  NGOs might be able to react through 
their national channels--if such channels exist--or they might be able to stage 
Seattle-style protests. 
   The second avenue for civil society participation is the amicus brief.  
Amicus briefs have been allowed in WTO proceedings since 1998, when the 
Appellate Body first accepted them in the Shrimp-Turtle case.23  However, the 
Dispute Settlement Body's panels and Appellate Body retain complete discretion 
in deciding to admit amicus briefs and, of course, in permitting the views of 
amici to influence their decisions.24   
 Not content with this limited progress, a number of scholars have 
proposed additional civil society reforms.  For instance, Dan Esty recommends 
establishing a new advisory committee on the environment, on which business, 
labor, consumer, and environmental groups would sit.25  He would also give 
NGOs observer status at all formal sessions of the WTO's General Council and 
other governing bodies.26  In a similar vein, Steve Charnovitz argues that the 
Committee on Trade and Development and the Committee on Trade and the 
Environment--committees that study rather than negotiate and decide matters--
should allow NGOs to participate in their work.27   In addition, Charnovitz 
                                                 
20 See Mattner, supra note__ at 135.  As specified in the Marrakesh Agreement, NGOs must 
demonstrate to the Secretariat that their work is related to WTO activities.   
21 World Trade Organization, Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/ngo_e/ngo_e.htm. 
22 World Trade Organization, Relations with Non-governmental Organizations/Civil Society, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/ngo_e/intro_e.htm. 
23 See Appellate Body, United States--Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 
para. 110, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998); see also Appellate Body, United States--Imposition of 
Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating 
in the United Kingdom, WT/DS138/AB/R (May 10, 2000) (holding that Appellate Body will accept 
and consider amicus briefs when "we find it pertinent and useful to do so").   
24 See Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Civil Society at the WTO: The Illusion of Inclusion, 7 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 
275, 277-80 (2001).   
25 Daniel C. Esty, Why the World Trade Organization Needs Environmental NGOs, 5 TRANSNAT’L ASS’NS 
267 (1999). 
26 Id. at 275-76.   
27 See Steve Charnovitz, WTO Cosmopolitics, 34 N.Y.U.J. INT’L L. & POL. 299, 343-44 (2002).   
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proposes a consultative body composed of NGO representatives that would give 
opinions on Ministerial outcomes, General Council Decisions, and Dispute 
Settlement Body reports.  As we shall see, some of these reforms and these 
proposals for further change find support in the political theory of civil society.  
Many, however, do not.   
 The European Union 
 It might appear odd to speak of the European Union in the same breath 
as the World Bank and the WTO.   The European Union is far more than a treaty 
and an international organization; indeed, many would argue that it is a quasi-
federal political system.  Yet the European Union has faced the same criticism, 
even harsher at times, as the World Bank and the WTO and it has come forward 
with a similar, though more far-reaching, civil society response.    
 The Danish referendum on the Maastricht Treaty, which contained an 
ambitious new set of commitments to monetary union, a common foreign policy, 
and cooperation on immigration and police matters, was a watershed moment 
for the European Union.28  In their referendum of 1992, the Danes rejected the 
Maastricht Treaty, followed by an extremely narrow "yes" vote in the French 
referendum and widespread public debate in the United Kingdom and 
Germany.  The Maastricht Treaty was eventually ratified, but this popular 
skepticism had the effect of triggering serious reflection on the normative and 
political underpinnings of European integration.  Some objections to the Treaty 
were fairly remote from the global governance debate:  the European Union had 
assumed many of the powers traditionally reserved to nation states, yet it did not 
possess the institutions typical of a democracy, nor did it enjoy the essential 
premise of a democracy--government identified with a group of individuals who 
recognize they share enough attributes and principles to constitute a single, 
deliberating, and consenting "people."29  But other objections to the Maastricht 
Treaty tracked the anti-globalization movement's critique of international 
economic organizations: the neo-liberal European common market was 
undermining social welfare, environmental protection, and other areas of state 
intervention.   
 Since 1992, the European Union's institutions have undergone radical 
change, including additional, far-reaching powers for the European Parliament 
and significant transparency and access to documents standards.30  New 
channels for civil society participation have also been added.  The principal one 
is the European Commission’s duty to consult civil society—trade unions, 
employer federations, consumer organizations, environmental organizations, 
                                                 
28 See PAUL CRAIG & GRÁINNE DE BÚRCA, EU LAW:  TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS 22 (3d ed. 2003) 
29 See J.H.H WEILER, THE CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE: “DO THE NEW CLOTHES HAVE AN EMPEROR?” AND 
OTHER ESSAYS ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 337 (1999).   
30 See Francesca Bignami, Creating European Rights: National Values and Supranational Interests, 11 
COLUM. J. EUR. L.  (forthcoming 2005).   
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human rights organizations, charitable organizations, community-based 
organizations, and religious organizations—on proposals for European 
legislation.31  These are the steps:  The Commission describes the issues open for 
discussion, the public is invited to submit written comments, and the civil society 
responses are published.32   This process is to take place largely through the 
Commission's website.  Then, when the Commission issues the final legislative 
proposal, the Commission  summarizes the comments and explains how the final 
proposal was or was not altered by the civil society responses.33   Legislative 
outcomes, however, cannot be challenged in court on the grounds that the 
consultation procedure was defective.  In other words, consultation does not 
confer legal rights.  In 2003, the first year after the procedure came into force, the 
Commission held a total of twenty-one public consultations, evidence of the 
extent to which the new procedure has taken root in the Commission.34 
 The civil society idea has thus been critical in reshaping international 
organizations over the past decade.  But it is also an idea in flux, whose 
implications have not been worked out fully in the multiple, overlapping arenas 
of global governance.  The time is ripe for examining the theoretical justifications 
for civil society and developing the normative implications for today's 
policymakers. 
The Morality of Liberal Democracy 
 My analysis begins from the premise of liberal democracy.  I employ a 
standard definition: terms of cooperation to which free, equal, and rational 
individuals living together in society would consent.35  Although contemporary 
philosophers dispute the nature of such terms of cooperation, most would agree 
that constitutional arrangements in a liberal society include, at a minimum, basic 
individual rights (freedom of conscience, equal treatment, property, and other 
liberties) and majority rule in certain domains of public life.36  The examination 
below of the political philosophy is limited to those thinkers that subscribe to the 
liberal model.   
This point of departure deserves a couple words of explanation.  The law 
that would most naturally apply to international organizations and their 
                                                 
31 See Communication from the Commission, Toward a reinforced culture of consultation and 
dialogue—General principles and minimum standards for consultation of interested parties by the 
Commission, COM (2002) 704 final, December 11, 2002, at 6. 
32 Id. at 19-22. 
33 Id. at 22. 
34 European Commission, General Report on the Activities of the European Union 22, para. 17 (2004).   
35 See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 16 (1993). 
36 See Ian Shapiro, The State of Democratic Theory, in POLITICAL SCIENCE: STATE OF THE DISCIPLINE 235, 
237-44 (Ira Katznelson & Helen V. Milner eds., 2002) (comparing deliberative democracy with 
Schumpeter’s theory of democracy); Jeremy Waldron, Justice, in POLITICAL SCIENCE: STATE OF THE 
DISCIPLINE 266, 278-79 (Ira Katznelson & Helen V. Milner eds., 2002) (discussing debate between 
Nozick and Rawls). 
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relations with civil society--international law--does not recognize liberal 
democracy as a guiding principle.  Over a decade ago, Thomas Franck famously 
argued that a right to democratic governance was emerging in international 
law.37  In making his case, he looked to the practice of nations: their consent to 
international treaties and agreements; their willingness to respect the written 
rules within their territories and to monitor and enforce those rules against their 
nation-state neighbors; and customary international law.  Yet Franck's assertion 
has been contested by many scholars, who point to the continuing existence of 
different regime types as evidence against an international consensus on 
democracy.38  Furthermore, even if the better scholarly view is the one that 
sustains an emerging right to democracy, that right would still come up short 
when matched against the constitutional principles of even a minimalist form of 
liberal democracy.  In international law, democracy entails elections for 
government officials, but without the separation of powers and the full array of 
individual liberties that are part of the liberal tradition.39  
Why, then, liberal democracy?  My objective in this paper is to reflect on 
the moral foundations of institutions of global governance—as opposed to the 
modus vivendi of contemporary international relations.  The liberal tradition in 
political philosophy, complete with its moral intuitions and its arguments from 
logic, offers one starting point for such an inquiry.  A familiar objection is that 
starting with liberalism devalues other social and political experiences--those 
places in the world that Rawls categorizes as “decent peoples," "outlaw states," 
"societies burdened by unfavorable conditions" and "benevolent absolutisms."40  
My response is that this paper represents but one attempt at uncovering the right 
and good organizing principles of international organizations; other attempts, 
based on alternative political traditions or on alternative readings of the liberal 
tradition, are welcomed.  Moreover, this analysis is limited to one, narrow area of 
international relations:  the common organizations and procedures through 
which today’s emerging regional and global communities are governed.  The 
normative framework developed below does not reach within the state to 
prescribe how political life is to be ordered there; it does not carry the same 
threat of intervention in the affairs of sovereign nations as other universalist 
visions.   
The phenomenon of international organizations that implicate directly 
the rights and duties of individuals—often without real consent or mediation by 
                                                 
37 See Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L. L. 46 (1992). 
38 See generally Benedict Kingsbury, Neo-Madisonian Global Constitutionalism: Thomas M. Franck’s 
Democratic Cosmopolitan Prospectus for Managing Diversity and World Order in the Twenty-First 
Century, 35 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 291, 298  (2003) (discussing debate sparked by Franck’s article).   
39 See Thomas Franck, Democracy as a Human Right, in HUMAN RIGHTS: AN AGENDA FOR THE NEXT 
CENTURY 73, 75 (Louis Henkin & John Hargrove eds., 1994); Gregory H. Fox & Georg Nolte, 
Intolerant Democracies, 36 HARV. INT'L L. J. 1 (1995). 
40 See JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 4 (1999).   
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the state parties to those organizations—is undeniable.  What are the 
ramifications of one political tradition for their relations with civil society? 
The History of the Civil Society Idea 
Today, civil society means associational life free of the state.  For most of 
the life of this concept, however, it meant the exact opposite:  relations among 
citizens through the institutions of the state. 41   Political theorists trace the idea to 
classical political philosophy, most notably, that of Aristotle.42  In the writings of 
the ancients, moral perfection was attained through collective life in a political 
community; all other human relations and allegiances were subsumed by that 
community. 
Observation tells us that every state [polis] is an association 
[koinōnia] and that every association is formed with a view to 
some good purpose.  I say 'good', because in all their actions all 
men do in fact aim at what they think is good.  Clearly then, as all 
associations aim at some good, that association which is most 
sovereign among them all and embraces all others will aim 
highest, i.e. at the most sovereign of all goods.  This is the 
association which we call the state, the association which is 
'political.' [Hē koinōnia politikē which certain contemporary 
thinkers also translate as "civil society."]43 
The social contract theorists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
continued to use civil society to signify political life.  Civil society referred to the 
individual living peacefully in society with other individuals through the 
constitution of legitimate political authority.  In the writings of Hobbes, Locke, 
and Rousseau, individuals in the state of nature decided by social contract to 
constitute themselves as civil society by creating a superior authority that would 
govern their relations.  The law set down by the superior authority would 
discipline the relations among those individuals who were parties to the social 
contract.  The nature of political authority was very different in the thought of 
the social contract theorists--absolute in Hobbes, liberal in Locke, participatory in 
Rousseau--but they all agreed that political authority was the necessary, defining 
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element of civil society. "In this old European tradition," John Keane writes, "civil 
society was coterminous with the state." 44 
Civil society [ koinōnia politiké, societas civilis, société civile, 
bürgerliche, Gesellschaft, Civill Society, società civile] and the state 
[polis, civitas, état, Staat, state, stato] were interchangeable terms.  
To be a member of a civil society was to be a citizen--a member of 
the state--and thus obligated to act in accordance with its laws and 
without engaging in acts harmful to other citizens.45 
In the late 1700s and early 1800s, the meaning of the concept gradually 
shifted to the one employed today, that is, social relations separate from the state.  
The shift is associated with the rise of commerce and the growing capacity of 
markets to organize and shape human relations.  In the thought of David Hume, 
Adam Smith, Adam Ferguson, and other figures of the Scottish Enlightenment, 
peaceful and good relations with fellow men were possible not only through 
politics but also through commerce.46  According to this line of thought, civil 
society was possible both through politics and government and through the 
pursuit of individual aims in economic exchange.  They had reservations about 
the new realm of commerce:  the specialization of economic functions and the 
geographically distant relations associated with the age of mercantilism could 
bring about the corruption of man and the downfall of the community or 
prosperity for the nation.47  Nonetheless, the sphere of peaceful and 
transformative human relations expanded to included both politics and 
commerce.  By the time Hegel published his Philosophy of Right in 1821, the 
analytic distinction between state and society was complete, and the language of 
"civil society" had come to refer, almost without exception, to human relations 
outside the realm of monarchy, parliaments, administration, law, courts, and the 
police.48  
It is important to avoid anachronisms in the telling of this brief history.   
Although social and political philosophers of the nineteenth century agreed on 
the distinction between state and society, they had very different theories of the 
dynamics of civil society.  Especially for Marx, civil society was constituted 
exclusively by material relations of production.  Human relations through 
churches, voluntary associations, and social movements--considered the core of 
today's civil society--were insignificant in the historical materialist account of the 
transition from capitalism to communism and life in the communist utopia.  
                                                 
44 Keane, Despotism and Democracy, supra note__at 35-36.   
45 Id.   
46 See J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE 
ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION 44-53 (1975). 
47 See id. at 470-512.   
48 See BOBBIO, DEMOCRACY AND DICTATORSHIP, supra note__ at 23.  
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Choral societies, gymnastic clubs, chambers of lawyers and doctors, clubs for the 
abolition of luxury clothing, and other such associations that existed in the 
Germany of Marx's day were irrelevant.49  Like the state, associational life and 
culture were treated as products of their materialist substructure.50  Moreover, 
for Marx, civil society in the here-and-now was not part of the good life.  In 
capitalism, materialist relations of production were inherently oppressive, and it 
was only after revolution and the economy's transformation into a place where 
individuals could freely choose and combine pursuits--farmer, inventor, 
tradesman, and intellectual--that civil society would serve as an arena for self-
expression and cooperative relations with one's fellow human beings.51   
The account of civil society by Marxist theorist Antonio Gramsci--still 
influential in contemporary European intellectual circles--was more variegated 
than Marx's.52  Gramsci posited that the civil sphere was distinct from the 
economic sphere and that this separation gave civil society a significant degree of 
autonomy from the relations of production in the economic sphere.  Civil society 
encompassed a wide array of values, ideologies, beliefs and voluntary 
associations, not just those of the dominant economic class.  Hence, even though 
the beliefs and ideologies of the bourgeoisie might be hegemonic, they were 
subject to challenge from other cultural forces.  In stark contrast to the theories of 
Marx, this contention was vital to the fall of capitalism and the disappearance of 
the state. 
Alexis de Tocqueville, influential in American political thought, 
attributed far more importance than Marxist theorists to associations outside the 
market.  Tocqueville observed voluntary associations of all stripes in nineteenth-
century American communities.  These, he claimed in Democracy in America, were 
essential to the success of national and state government:  they were the "great 
free schools to which all citizens come to be taught the general theory of 
association."53 
The Political Theory of Civil Society 
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Over the past fifteen years or so, the concept of civil society has 
experienced a revival.54  It has surfaced in the analysis of government and public 
life in virtually all parts of the world: Eastern Europe, Latin America, Africa, 
Asia, Western democracies, and international regimes.  Most scholars in the 
social sciences and political philosophy who analyze this phenomenon argue that 
associations outside the state are key to individual freedom and good 
government.  Without civil society, they argue, individuals are incapable of 
fulfilling their essential capacities, and life with their fellow human-beings--
society--is impossible or unsatisfactory.  Scholars are divided, however, on what 
they consider to be "liberty" and the contribution of civil society and government 
to its pursuit.  Their assessment of these fundamental questions leads to different 
definitions of civil society and different prescriptions for the public policy of civil 
society.  This section reviews the four types of claims for how associational life 
outside the state contributes to liberal democracy, claims that can be loosely 
identified with four different theories of government: liberal, republican, 
communitarian, and cosmopolitan.55  The purpose is three-fold:  to bring to light 
the reasons for giving civil society pride of place in good, global governance, to 
draw out the policy implications of the theories, and to expose the shortcomings 
of the existing theories in addressing today’s question of the appropriate role for 
civil society in global governance. 
Liberal Theory   
The liberal strand of civil society thinking is inspired by the transition 
over the past three decades from dictatorship to democracy.   This is what 
Samuel Huntington famously called the "Third Wave" of democratization in 
countries around the world: Spain and Portugal in the 1970s; Argentina, Brazil, 
and Uruguay as well as countries in Africa and Asia in the 1980s; the countries of 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union in the 1990s.  Much empirical 
analysis of new democracies makes the case that associational life outside the 
state was critical in enabling democracy to take hold.   In these accounts of 
democratization, the collapse of dictatorship was preceded by a rise in the 
number of voluntary associations, churches, social movements, and other forms 
of organized social life, all subsumed under the category of "civil society."   For 
instance, scholars of Polish politics link the fall of the Communist government in 
1989 to the proliferation of underground dissident groups, the rise of the trade 
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union movement "Solidarity," and the growing independence of the Catholic 
Church in the 1970s and 1980s.56   
The liberal justification for civil society rests on a vision of politics in 
which the ability to choose freely one's life projects is critical to liberty and in 
which the possibility of conflict among different life projects is healthy, not cause 
for concern.57  The fact that my desire to develop my capacities and use my 
resources can conflict with those very same desires in my neighbor does not pose 
an intractable problem for peaceful, public life or for the basic liberty of others to 
pursue their self-chosen ends.  In the liberal theory of politics, organizations and 
groups independent of the state constitute arenas in which different interests, 
identities, and aspirations can flourish.  A pluralistic civil society is an end in and 
of itself because the many associations of civil society enable individuals to 
pursue their self-chosen life projects; pluralism is necessary to liberty.  Civil 
society also serves the consequentialist purpose of checking state power and 
thereby contributing to democracy.  Private organizations constitute centers of 
power that compete with the state and can thus curb the excesses of electoral and 
bureaucratic politics.  Furthermore, through associations, citizens can examine 
government policy critically and mobilize for and against the hundreds of 
choices made every day by elected and appointed public officials. 
The importance liberal thinkers attach to pluralism and the different 
visions of the good life leads them to adopt a highly inclusive definition of civil 
society.  As long as the organization is not part of the coercive apparatus of the 
state, it is civil society.  All purposes and all modes through which individuals 
combine to further those purposes fit within the definition.  Market-based 
organizations--corporations, labor unions, employer associations, and industry 
lobbies--as well as families, neighborhood watches, veterans associations, and 
environmental groups, all count as civil society.58   
The liberal model generates a number of prescriptions for the public 
policy of civil society.  Foremost among these, the state must guarantee the 
fundamental rights of free speech and free association.59  Without these rights, 
individuals cannot pursue their diverse aims with other, like-minded 
individuals.  And civil society is not free to oppose and check state authority.  
Some thinkers in the liberal tradition go further.   Michael Walzer, for instance, 
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praises the associational life of civil society as "the actual ground where versions 
of the good are worked out and tested . . . and proved to be partial, incomplete, 
ultimately unsatisfying."60  But he also cautions that "civil society, left to itself, 
generates radically unequal power relationships, which only state power can 
challenge."61  Thus, unlike others in this tradition, Walzer is concerned that the 
exercise of liberty by some might diminish that of others; he believes that the 
state can mediate among conflicting liberty claims without degenerating into 
authoritarianism.  Hence, Walzer adds redistributive public policy 
recommendations to the basic package of liberal rights: measures to enable those 
voluntary associations disadvantaged by the inequitable distribution of resources 
in contemporary societies--working families, consumer cooperatives, labor 
unions, organizations of ethnic minorities--to further their ends and participate 
in democratic life.62 
Republican Theory 
The republican justification for civil society is tied to the experience with 
associational life in old, western democracies.  In contrast to the studies of new 
democracies, those of old democracies, mostly notably Robert Putnam's 
magisterial review of American associational life in Bowling Alone, have shown 
that membership in voluntary organizations is on the decline.63  In Bowling Alone, 
Putnam demonstrates that, since the 1960s, membership in all types of 
organizations has dwindled; both organizations directly engaged in civic life, 
such as the League of Women's Voters, and those with purposes that have little 
apparent connection to civic life, such as local singing clubs, have been shrinking. 
This phenomenon is troubling to Putnam and others because, in their 
view, joining and participating in voluntary organizations trains men and 
women for citizenship.  In contrast to the liberal vision of democracy, the 
republican model perceives a tension between the fulfillment of self-chosen aims 
and the peaceful and prosperous ordering of public affairs.  The pursuit of self-
interest and particularistic identities can precipitate the breakdown of 
community—through civil war or, less dramatically, through ineffective 
government, unable to provide basic public goods such as clean water and 
healthcare.  This in turn compromises liberty.  In the republican vision, for 
society to be possible and for government to work, individuals must learn certain 
skills and virtues of citizenship--skills and virtues that redefine the concept of 
individual liberty.  And, according to Putnam and others, the voluntary 
associations of civil society is where this learning occurs.  Putnam articulates this 
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understanding of the relationship between liberty and good government as 
social capital: in the small-scale setting of the bowling league or the local union 
organization, individuals learn the habits of cooperation, reciprocity, and trust 
that are necessary for all collective endeavors, including good government.  
These habits, critical for organizing soccer games and neighborhood watches, are 
likewise critical for voting for national representatives and engaging in public 
debate with fellow citizens on the pressing matters of the day.64 
Modern day civil society enthusiasts might be surprised to hear that they 
fit within a republican tradition that can be traced back to the classical Greek and 
Roman republics, the civic humanists of the Italian Renaissance, and Rousseau.65  
The analytical concept of social capital, based upon contemporary game theory 
and the strategies necessary for overcoming the collective action dilemma 
identified by game theory, appear a long way off from the republican virtue of 
active citizenship.  Perhaps even more puzzling than this identification of 
republican virtue with social capital is the well-known republican suspicion of 
intermediate groups:  in the republican tradition such associations command the 
loyalties of citizens at the expense of their loyalties to the association of the 
whole, namely the state.  Nevertheless, the new idea of civil society as the 
incubator of the cooperation skills necessary for democracy shares basic, 
common premises with the old concept of republican democracy.  In both, the 
individual pursuit of particularized interests creates difficulties for government.  
The answer for both is the creation of a common reservoir of values and 
aspirations, albeit through slightly different means: experience in the voluntary 
associations of civil society in the social capital school of thought, and education 
in civic and moral virtues in the republican one. 
Republican theory is more selective than liberal theory in defining the 
ambit of civil society.  Two types of associations are generally excluded because 
their aims and internal structure are such that they cannot serve as incubators of 
cooperation skills.  The first are market actors: corporations, partnerships, other 
profit-seeking entities, and the small, specialized pressure groups that represent 
their interests in public life.66  Maximizing profits in capitalist markets and 
influencing politics to the material advantage of corporations do not require 
reciprocity and cooperation and hence do not lead to the creation of social 
capital.  In collective behavior oriented towards markets, the material rewards of 
success are immediate enough that the participants need not develop the norms 
necessary to achieve success in other spheres.  Furthermore, the rigidly 
hierarchical internal structure of most large economic entities enables them to 
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pursue goals without developing social capital among their employees.  
Hierarchy exists because those at the top have numerous material incentives to 
induce compliance from those at the bottom.  In other words, hierarchical 
organizations can rely on the concentration of material resources among their 
governing members--the power to hire and fire, set salaries, and decide on office 
space--to induce others to further the organization's aims.  Therefore, these 
organizations can survive without the social capital that is vital to other 
associations.   
The second type of association that republican theorists exclude from the 
ambit of civil society is the specialized organization that focuses on political 
advocacy and that has neither a rank-and-file membership nor the capacity to 
mobilize large numbers of individuals when necessary.67  Like firms, the internal 
dynamics of small pressure groups--whether they fall into the private or public-
interest categories--are not conducive to building social capital and nurturing 
good citizens.  That is because the professionals who staff the national offices of 
organizations such as the Center for Science in the Public Interest (a foundation-
funded, pro-consumer group) or Citizens for a Sound Economy (a corporate-
funded, anti-big government group) have very little daily connection to the 
individuals and the interests they represent.  Citizens might agree with their 
political aims and even donate money to their causes, but it is unlikely that their 
sympathy for such causes will spur them to other forms of civic action. 
The republican justification for civil society, like the liberal one, gives rise 
to a number of public policy recommendations.  Many of them are directed at 
individual citizens, rather than at government policymakers, on the theory that 
social capital must be rebuilt from below.  Citizens must make the personal 
choice to join and participate in community life and voluntary associations.68  
Some of the recommendations, however, are directed at statesmen too.  In Better 
Together, the policy-oriented book that followed on the heels of the empirical case 
in Bowling Alone, Putnam makes a number of pro-civil society suggestions:69  The 
tax code, through deductions and other incentives for donations to voluntary 
organizations, can promote civil society.  Smart urban planning can enable 
individuals to spend less time commuting and more time participating in 
associations.  Employment and labor laws that would allow working parents to 
demand flexible work schedules can help citizens spend more time with their 
children and become involved in community initiatives.  Public investment in 
education creates one of the important pre-conditions for participating in 
associational life and developing social capital.  Local government institutions 
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and procedures that give grassroots associations a say in public decisionmaking 
can create incentives for such associations to form in the first place.  Reflecting on 
a civil society experience in Portland, Oregon, Putnam says:  "By opening up to 
local organizations and giving them responsibility, government created an 
incentive for local organization.  On the other hand, the fact that activists 
pressured the city government to give them a voice was integral to that 
development."70  Most simply, government can promote civil society by giving 
citizen associations legal powers and tax dollars that ordinarily would be used 
and spent by public officials.  For example, Putnam cites these pro-civil society 
government policies:  the decision of the City of Boston to delegate the power of 
eminent domain to allow a local neighbor association to purchase and develop 
land in central Boston; state and federal funding for a tutoring program in 
Philadelphia sponsored and run by a local volunteer group; state funding for a 
jobs program and a sewer system that were the object of a grassroots faith-based 
campaign in Texas.    
Harvard sociologist Theda Skocpol has developed an important critique 
of Putnam's thesis and has put forward her own--still fundamentally republican-
-model of civil society.71  Skocpol argues, contra Putnam, that what is 
troublesome about the history of twentieth-century American civic life is not the 
decline in the absolute number of associations and members.  Rather, what is 
disturbing is the decline in a certain type of association:  nationwide 
organizations with local chapters that mobilize citizens from many different 
walks of life in the pursuit of common goals, such as the Order of the Sons of 
Temperance, the Young Men's Christian Association, and the National Congress 
of Mothers (PTA).72   
 The decline in large membership associations is troubling to Skocpol 
because, for national government to work, citizens must develop solidarities and 
institutional structures than enable them to press for common causes with their 
counterparts across the nation.  As in the standard republican account, Skocpol 
believes that civil society can overcome the tension between the pursuit of self-
chosen aims and public life.  However, Skocpol argues that in a political system 
that is national in scope, civil society must also be national, for otherwise elites 
will be able to act without any contribution from the broad mass of citizens 
scattered throughout the nation.  Associations provide the necessary connective 
tissue for nationwide citizenship.  Without truly national citizenship, elites will 
inevitably make public decisions to further their own ends and not those of 
ordinary people.  According to Skocpol, this critique goes for associational elites 
as much as for economic and government ones:  professionalized citizen 
advocacy groups--and the post-material values of the upper-middle class 
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individuals who staff and fund those groups--have drowned out the 
distributional concerns of the working class.73   
Skocpol's understanding of the contribution associations make to national 
democracy leads to a somewhat different definition of civil society from that 
employed by social capital theorists.   Like them, she excludes profit-making 
entities and their associations as well as small, professionalized pressure groups 
without a membership base.  But she also excludes purely local groups that have 
no ambition to engage in public debate or to take part in civic life beyond the 
neighborhood or town.74   
As for the prescriptive part of Skocpol's analysis, she makes a number of 
recommendations "designed to get broadly organized groups of people into politics."75  
In marked contrast with Putnam's approach, her proposals are designed to foster 
associations that pursue a particular type of aim--political--and that do so by 
mobilizing and involving citizens on a nation-wide basis.  This, Skocpol argues, 
might be accomplished by repealing laws currently on the books that prohibit 
associations from donating to political campaigns and that discourage 
associations from fostering political debate and engaging in partisan politics.76 
Skocpol also recommends procedures that give associations with broad 
memberships a special place in Congressional deliberations; this type of access 
would create incentives for such associations to form in the first place. 77   
 Communitarian Theory 
Communitarian theories of civil society, like republican ones, have 
become salient in contemporary debates because of the impoverished state of 
associational life in modern-day America.78  For communitarians, a good society 
depends on good individuals, who, in turn, are constituted by the social and 
political community to which they belong.  The distinction between collective 
prosperity and individual liberty is far less pronounced than in the other strands 
of thought.  Communitarian thinkers care about the types of life projects that 
individuals pursue with others in civil society because those life projects 
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constitute the moral foundation of the liberal political order.  As  leading 
communitarian theorist Amitai Etzioni puts it:   
[A] well-functioning society, let alone a good one, requires a core 
of substantive (rather than merely procedural) shared values, 
which in part define not only public but also private proper 
behavior.  These values are transmitted from generation to 
generation by the family, schools, and the community (including 
its places of worship and civic associations).  Moral dialogues then 
recast values bequeathed by earlier generations.79 
Because of this theory of individual liberty and political community, the decline 
of associational life in contemporary American is an especially urgent problem 
for communitarians.  The personal and collective good lives are inextricably 
intertwined, and both are inconceivable without a civil society that nurtures and 
imparts certain core values.   
Given this view, civil society in communitarian thinking is mainly local--
family, neighborhood, and town--for only in those settings are relations with 
others so thick and frequent that personhood is shaped by community.  The 
public policy recommendations made by communitarians are designed to foster 
this form of local associationalism.  Some communitarian reformers argue that 
the tax dollars and legal powers of the state should go directly to local charities, 
churches, and communities.   Concretely, this might take the form of tax 
deductions for donations to charities and federal grants to churches and local 
philanthropic associations that provide social services. 
As Skocpol notes, the communitarian and social capital schools of 
thought share a certain affinity.80  Both communitarians and social capitalists 
argue that good government is predicated upon the thick, civil society relations 
that are found most often at the local level;  therefore both gravitate to many of 
the same prescriptions for individual action and government reform.  
Nonetheless, a critical difference separates the two.  Communitarians identify a 
specific list of values that the associations of civil society are to promote--values 
such as devotion to one's children and parents, giving to the less fortunate, and 
belief in God.  By contrast, republicans avoid privileging one set of ends over 
another, except for the fundamental civic virtues of cooperation and trust.81 
Cosmopolitan Theory 
Cosmopolitan theorists--analysts of political systems that extend beyond 
the nation-state--make yet a fourth set of arguments on the interrelated issues of 
                                                 
79 See Amitai Etzioni, Law in Civil Society, Good Society, and the Prescriptive State, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
355 (2000).   
80 See SKOCPOL, DIMINISHED DEMOCRACY, supra note__ at 9.   
81 See Etzioni, Law in Civil Society, supra note__at 366, 367, 375, 376.   
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the democratizing effects of civil society, the organizations that count as civil 
society, and the policy measures that should be adopted in favor of civil society.  
Just as liberal theorists are impressed by the resurgence of civil society in the 
Third Wave of democratization, and republican and communitarian theorists are 
troubled by the decline of civic life in the United States, cosmopolitan theorists 
are stirred by the rise of associations and social movements that span the globe.  
Associations and informal networks that mobilize individuals across national 
borders, focus on global issues, and target multiple countries and multilateral 
regimes in order to achieve their goals, are spreading.82  This phenomenon 
includes long-standing organizations, such as Amnesty International and the 
World Wildlife Fund, as well as more spontaneous social movements, such as the 
anti-globalization networks responsible for the protests at the WTO ministerial in 
Seattle.  Cosmopolitan theorists hope that the new, world-wide mobilization 
from below will serve as the catalyst for the democratization of global regimes.   
 The case for global civil society has not been made with the same analytic 
precision as the arguments for civil society at the domestic level.  Nevertheless, 
many of the same themes can be discerned.  The liberal vision of associations as 
vehicles for the pursuit of individual life projects and as checks on state power is 
implicit in much of the writing on global civil society.83  The literature on 
international aid relies heavily on social capital and communitarian theories: 
today the common wisdom is that aid should be given to local associations, not 
only to governments.  Why?  Because by giving such associations responsibility 
for implementing development projects and providing social services, 
international aid will build citizenship skills, improve the capacity for self-
government, and strengthen communities.84    
Notwithstanding some overlap with the literature on national democracy, 
the literature on global governance also reflects a distinct theory of civil society.  
Thinkers like Daniele Archibugi, Richard Falk, David Held, Mary Kaldor, and 
John Keane argue that a global society is necessary to curb the forces of global 
capital.85  According to this line of analysis, severe hardship has resulted from 
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globalization.  The heads of state and international bureaucrats in control of 
international regimes have failed to respond to globalization’s injustices; these 
elites cannot ensure that the forces of global capital are harnessed to the 
advantage of ordinary people.  Thus, in the cosmopolitan line of reasoning, 
global civil society must seize control of international organizations.  To this end, 
it is critical that citizens of one country come to identify with citizens of other 
countries based on their shared human experiences.  Transnational groups based 
on common circumstances of poverty, environmental depredation, and other 
injustices should interact with other transnational groups to influence global 
decisionmakers.  For cosmopolitans, global civil society is the key to creating a 
truly democratic international order; only when world citizens organize and 
identify with other world citizens can they can assert control over global 
capitalism and illegal state action. 
Transnational social forces provide the only vehicle for the 
promotion of the law of humanity, a normative focus that is 
animated by humane sustainable development for all peoples, 
North and South, and seeks to structure such commitments by 
way of human geo-governance . . . .  To suggest the political 
dynamics associated with these conceptions, I propose the 
terminology of 'globalization-from-below' to identify these 
transnational democratic forces, and their implicit dedication to the 
creation of a global civil society that is an alternative scenario of the 
future to that of the global political economy being shaped by 
transnational market forces.  The hopes of humanity depend, in 
my view, upon the capacities of globalization- from-below to 
challenge effectively the prevailing dominance of globalization-
from-above in a series of key arenas that can be identified in very 
general terms as the UN (and other international institutions and 
regimes), the media, the orientation of states.86 
Cosmopolitans define civil society very differently from liberal, 
republican, and communitarian thinkers.  For cosmopolitans, non-state 
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associations are not, taken by themselves, civil society.  The global people is 
global civil society.  The citizens of the world, together with their non-state 
associations, constitute civil society.  This definition is markedly different from 
that employed in domestic political theory.  At the domestic level, "civil society" 
is separate from "the people": "civil society" refers exclusively to organizations 
outside the state; "the people" refers to long-standing national identities 
embodied in national constitutions, electoral politics, and the representative 
institutions of democracy.  Further, cosmopolitans depart from their liberal 
counterparts in excluding large market actors--namely, multinational 
corporations and organizations representing multinationals--from their 
definition of civil society.  Given that global capital is one of the forces to be 
curbed by civil society, organizations and individuals that serve the interests of 
capital cannot be part of civil society.   
A cosmopolitan, integrated public sphere in which national borders 
disappear does not yet exist.87  To fill this void, thinkers like John Keane, Richard 
Falk, and Mary Kaldor urge social activists to mobilize transnationally and to 
fight for a more just, peaceful, and environmentally sound world. This 
prescription echoes the republican and communitarian calls for citizens to 
organize from below.   
In addition, a number of cosmopolitan theorists have called for a directly 
elected world parliament that would represent global civil society in 
international lawmaking. They believe that elections and a legislative assembly 
would ensure that the voice of civil society is heard by international elites.  For 
instance, Richard Falk and Andrew Strauss advocate a "Global Peoples 
Assembly." 88  Strikingly, voluntary associations and intermediate organizations 
are absent from this single institutional reform proposed by cosmopolitans.89 
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While Falk and Strauss argue that citizens and their associations should have the 
right to lobby the Global Peoples Assembly, they do not recommend a direct role 
for private organizations, nor does the logic of representative democracy suggest 
such a role. 
The ambition expressed in the proposals for a world parliament is 
admirable but, on closer examination, such proposals reveal a fundamental 
inconsistency.  In instituting a world assembly, cosmopolitan thinkers assume 
into being precisely that which they lament is lacking from world politics: a 
global civil society or global people.  That is, cosmopolitan thinkers assume the 
existence of a global people that would mobilize during elections, vote, and then 
follow and monitor the decisions of their global representatives.  Yet it is not 
obvious that simply instituting elections and a world parliament would lead to 
the formation of such a global consciousness.90  The European Parliament is a 
legislative assembly that operates in what was previously a classic international 
organization, with powers beyond the wildest dreams of even the most 
optimistic cosmopolitans.  Yet the European public has displayed a stubborn 
indifference to elections for the European Parliament and the daily activities of 
their parliamentarians.91  Cosmopolitans do not have a clear vision of how public 
policy can promote an integrated, global public sphere.  Nor do they squarely 
address the question of  how associations outside the state can contribute--and, 
through public policy initiatives, can be encouraged to contribute--to the creation 
of such an integrated public sphere.   
The arguments and implications of the theories of civil society are 
summarized below. 
 
Table 1:  Theories of Civil Society: Justifications, Definitions, and 
Policy Prescriptions 
 Justification Definition Policy prescriptions 
                                                 
90 Hassan El Menyawi has recently put forward a interesting proposal that combines global 
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Interdependencies, 11 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 83, 96, 125, 130-31 (2004).   
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Liberal Allow individuals to 
realize diverse life 
projects and check 
government power 
All associations Liberal rights 
Republican 
 Robert 
Putnam 
 Theda 
Skocpol 
 
 Build social 
capital among 
citizens 
 Encourage 
mobilization of 
citizens on a 
national scale 
 
 All associations 
except 
corporations, 
corporate 
lobbies, and 
professionalized 
pressure groups 
 Large, 
nationwide 
federations 
engaged in 
national political 
debates 
 
 Tax code reform to 
encourage private 
donations, urban 
planning to reduce 
sprawl, employment 
regulation to allow 
workers to spend more 
time with family and 
participate in 
community 
organizations, public 
investment in 
education, 
opportunities for 
participation in local 
government, transfer of 
public powers and tax 
dollars to associations 
 Provide incentives for 
associations to engage 
in partisan politics, 
afford large 
membership 
associations a special 
role in Congressional 
deliberations  
Communitarian Mores inculcated by 
civil society essential 
to self-identity and 
good government  
Family, churches, 
local associations 
Transfer some responsibility 
for social services from 
federal government to local 
charities and churches 
Cosmopolitan  Assert popular 
control over forces of 
globalization 
Integrated, global 
public sphere, i.e., 
"the global people," 
excluding capital  
Global Peoples Assembly 
 
The Implications of Political Theory for Global Governance 
 How can these different visions of civil society be used to transform 
international organizations?  First, the liberal theory of civil society.  It is 
undeniable that, by banding together in associations, citizens pursue their 
diverse life projects and check the power of the state.  Contemporary democracy 
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is inconceivable without a vibrant public sphere in which citizens and their 
associations have the right to criticize government actors.  This is true as much at 
the international level as in national political communities.  Of course, 
comparative constitutional law demonstrates that contemporary democracies 
part ways over where the rights to free expression and association end and the 
rights to privacy and against discrimination begin.  However, it is not necessary 
to dwell here on any of these thorny debates of constitutional law.  It is enough 
to observe that citizens and their organizations must enjoy a core of speech, 
association, and other liberal rights if the different sites of global governance are 
to be democratic. 
Liberal theory's policy prescriptions are largely in place in the global 
realm; they are firmly established in the European Union.  The Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, which contains provisions on freedom of opinion and 
expression, and freedom of assembly and association, has been ratified by over 
130 countries.  Together with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 
Covenant serves as a source of law binding upon international organizations 
when they deal directly with citizens and associations.92  In the European Union, 
the Court of Justice has guaranteed freedom of expression and freedom of 
association since the 1980s;  these rights have since been codified in the European 
Charter of Fundamental Rights.93   
One of the prerequisites of the liberal right to oppose global policies--
transparency--is also, gradually, becoming standard practice in global regimes.94  
Transparency is the right of citizens to know what government has decided.  Or, 
from the government perspective, it is the duty to broadcast, in a timely fashion, 
public decisions in language accessible to the ordinary citizen so that citizens and 
their associations can debate, criticize, and hold public officials to account.  
Among the international organizations canvassed earlier, the European Union 
has made the most far-reaching transparency innovations:  it has adopted a 
system of access to government documents that is as comprehensive as any 
national system.  The WTO and the World Bank have also made significant 
transparency improvements.   And additional changes are in order.  For instance, 
the Catholic development organization CIDSE-Caritas Internationalis 
                                                 
92 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 71, arts. 19 & 20, U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948); 
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recommends that the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund make the 
transcripts and minutes of board meetings available to the public.95 
Even though this liberal tradition is widely accepted, there are substantial 
incentives at the international level for statesmen to ignore their constitutional 
duties.  Transparency, speech, and contestation are not in the short-term interests 
of decisionmakers.  The deals reached in international negotiations might not 
survive vigorous public scrutiny; rights to speech and association are risky, and 
when given the choice, politicians and bureaucrats would prefer to do without 
them.  In sum, while the liberal rights necessary for a vibrant civil society might 
figure prominently in the rhetoric and written law of the international realm, the 
realities of international organizations suggest that such rights are fragile and 
that vigorous advocacy is necessary for them to take hold.  
Now consider the republican and communitarian models.  Although their 
understanding of how civil society contributes to good government differs, their 
practical policy recommendations converge.  They would promote civil society 
by allowing citizen groups more opportunities for participating in policymaking 
and transferring certain public powers to such groups.  Somewhat less 
vigorously, they recommend indirectly subsidizing private associations through 
tax code reform.    
Republican and communitarian theories also agree on which non-state 
associations should not benefit from such measures:  corporate actors and 
professionalized pressure groups without significant memberships.  In other 
words, pro-civil society policies should not extend to corporations, corporate 
lobbies, and public interest advocacy groups without a membership base.   Thus, 
based strictly on the logic of civil society theory, the indiscriminate civil society 
reforms of the last decade are misguided.  WTO ministerials and dispute 
settlement proceedings should not be open to all associations because some of 
those associations--corporations and small pressure groups—do not deserve 
such advantages.  Likewise for European Commission consultations.  
While this indifference to profit-driven actors is not particularly 
surprising, the absence of any analytical or empirical basis for institutional 
reform targeted at small groups of social activists is striking.  This is because 
those who advocate most stridently opening international doors to civil society 
are small, public interest NGOs.   Yet liberal democracy theory would shut them 
out because they fall into the pressure group camp, not the civil society one.  Not 
to say that activists without a rank-and-file cannot, on other grounds, make 
claims on global institutions.  For instance, some groups can argue that they 
promote substantive ends that have been unfairly excluded from global politics.  
Or, they might claim that small networks of activists help build an integrated, 
global public sphere and that public resources and powers should be allocated to 
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such networks to support their initiatives.  But it is important to note that the 
prevailing political theory—including cosmopolitan theory—does not articulate 
such hypotheses.  The moral case for networks and associations of activists 
focused on promoting their public interest agendas, rather than building broad-
based, grassroots constituencies, has not been made. 
Where republican and communitarian theories disagree is on which non-
state associations should benefit from pro-civil society policies:  Local or national 
associations?  Service-oriented or politically active associations?  While thinkers 
like Robert Putnam and Amitai Etzioni stress local associations focused on 
community-building, Theda Skocpol emphasizes large, diverse membership 
organizations that mobilize to change national public policy. There is some 
tension between these two views.  Incentives in favor of local associations might 
detract from the efforts of large, nationwide organizations; tax dollars and 
policymaking influence might be given to one at the expense of the other.  But for 
our purposes, it does not seem that a choice is necessary.  The reality of political 
life in international regimes is so distant from either model--it is closed to 
associations of all sorts--that it is difficult to imagine that measures promoting 
one brand of association would be so far-reaching as to disadvantage the other 
brand.  Associations in all their possible permutations would appear to 
contribute, in distinctive ways, to democratizing international regimes. 
International organizations like the World Bank have already begun to 
build on the insights of the social capital and communitarian schools.  Most of 
the World Bank reforms examined earlier are targeted at local NGOs.  Funding 
local associations, giving them a voice in loan decisions, and allowing them to 
criticize project implementation render such associations important players in 
the Bank's public sphere.  By encouraging the formation local civil society, these 
World Bank policies not only contribute to democratization of domestic polities, 
but also to the democratization of the international aid regime.  
The European Union has also taken up the issue of local civil society.  The 
European Commission has encouraged Member States to do more to promote 
local voluntary associations.96  Moreover, some of the European Union's funding 
for social programs is distributed through local NGOs.97  
International organizations could do more in favor of local civil society. 
Many critics complain that the World Bank has been too passive in the face of 
recipient government resistance to civil society; they also claim that the Bank's 
own decisionmaking processes have failed to live up to the high standards for 
civil society participation set for developing countries.98  Furthermore, as the 
reader will have remarked, the WTO has been absent from this discussion. Even 
though most trade issues have significant consequences for local communities, 
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not much has been done to use this as an opportunity to involve local 
associations and thus foster grass-roots democracy.  One possible innovation 
would be WTO funding for local civil society in developing countries, similar to 
the World Bank's Small Grants Program.  This would enable local groups to 
consider and to influence the trade issues being decided by the WTO.  
Notwithstanding all the possibilities for innovation, the institutions of global 
governance are headed in the right direction;  the social capital and 
communitarian ideas of civil society should serve as an impetus for further 
institutional reform.  
And what of Skocpol’s republicanism?  While Skocpol limits her analysis 
to the United States, it can be extended by analogy beyond the nation-state.  In 
the global sphere, nationwide membership organizations translate into 
transnational associations, organizations with numerous members spread across 
different countries.  For some of the very same reasons that nationwide 
membership organizations are important to American democracy, we might 
expect that transnational associations will be important to democracy in global 
polities.  Skocpol focuses on a historical phenomenon—the development of a 
national economy and polity in the United States—that bears some resemblance 
to today’s accumulation of economic and political power in new sites of global 
governance.  She chronicles the simultaneous rise of a national government and 
national voluntary associations in nineteenth and early twentieth-century 
America.  And she notes the vital role of such associations in enabling ordinary 
citizens to participate in democratic politics: 
Directly, therefore, as well as in a number of indirect ways, 
America's traditional voluntary membership federations fostered 
active citizenship and made a difference in politics and 
governance.  Federations were especially vital in building an 
American democracy in which ordinary people could participate, 
gain skills, and forge recurrent ties to one another--not just locally 
but also across communities, states, and regions of a vast and 
expanding nation. . . .  Over the long run of U.S. history, voluntary 
membership federations have both complemented and rivaled 
political parties in setting the course of politics and government.  
By coordinating and inspiring so many people across the myriad 
districts that elect representatives to U.S., state, and national 
legislatures, voluntary federations have been able to exert 
democratic leverage.  Federations combine state and national 
reach with local presence, the best way to influence U.S. elected 
officials.99 
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 This explanation of the importance of nationwide federations is 
instructive for cosmopolitan reformers in the global sphere.  As mentioned 
earlier, cosmopolitan thinkers have not developed a specific theory of how non-
state associations might democratize global politics.  They focus more broadly on 
the global people.  Cosmopolitans oppose the concentration of economic and 
political power in the hands of the elites running multinational corporations and 
international economic organizations.  But cosmopolitans also recognize that the 
global people cannot exercise their democratic will because citizens are still 
separated by national borders.  The voluminous literature on the democratic 
deficit in the European Union repeats this complaint.  Without a Europe-wide 
political consciousness, citizens will not engage on the everyday questions 
settled in Brussels and Europe cannot be truly democratic.  One remedy to the 
cosmopolitan and European dilemma, suggested by Skocpol's analysis, is the 
formation of large membership organizations that span entire regions or, indeed, 
the globe.  Far-flung organizations that routinely bring together their national 
members might enable citizens and activists to mobilize across state lines, just as 
nationwide organizations with local chapters did in early twentieth century 
America.   Transnational associations might be one means of overcoming the 
tension between central political and economic power and local democracy.   
Among the international organizations surveyed at the beginning of this 
paper, only the European Union encourages transnational associations.  The 
European Commission reserves seats on various advisory committees for 
representatives of transnational associations, not national or local 
organizations.100   An international organization not considered specifically here--
the United Nations--also has a long-established practice of privileging 
transnational associations.  Before associations may participate in UN activities, 
they must satisfy certain size and breadth criteria. Only large, international 
NGOs whose policy agendas cover multiple issues qualify for general 
consultative status before the UN's Economic and Social Council.101  This special 
status entitles NGOs to receive provisional agendas, place items on the agenda, 
sit as observers at public meetings, submit brief written statements, consult with 
members of the Secretariat, and request to make oral presentations at public 
meetings.   
Building on this precedent, other international organizations could 
privilege transnational associations in their policymaking activities, with a view 
to encouraging their formation and their corresponding transnational 
solidarities.  Not in policymaking with mainly local effects, such as the 
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management of World Bank project loans.  Rather, transnational associations 
might be called upon to advise on policies of concern to multiple countries or 
regions.  Furthermore, some of the same initiatives undertaken to promote local 
civil society could be targeted as well at transnational civil society.  Direct 
funding of associations could go to organizations that meet certain threshold 
requirements of membership numbers and geographic distribution.  Moreover, 
heeding Skocpol's call to politics, such funding could go not only to associations 
devoted to economic development or social welfare, but also to those engaged in 
partisan, political activities. 
In making these reforms, policymakers should not lose sight of the local.  
It is important to remember Michael Sandel's admonition that in a globalizing 
world, local community will and must continue to shape self-identities, inculcate 
moral virtues and foster social learning: 
It is difficult to imagine a [cosmopolitan] world in which persons 
were so virtuous that they had no friends, only a universal 
disposition to friendliness.  The problem is not simply that such a 
world would be difficult to bring about but that it would be 
difficult to recognize as a human world.  The love of humanity is a 
noble sentiment, but most of the time we live our lives by smaller 
solidarities.  This may reflect certain limits to the bounds of moral 
sympathy.  More important, it reflects the fact that we learn to 
love humanity not in general but through its particular 
expressions.102   
But even though a global neighborhood lacks the intimacy of the local, the 
current historical circumstances of globalization and the vital role of 
cosmopolitan solidarities in democratizing international regimes cannot be 
ignored. 
 Before turning to some of the questions left unanswered by political 
theory, it is worthwhile pointing out the peculiarities of applying, to the global 
arena, ideas developed in the context of national political orders.  In one, limited 
respect, it is easier to apply liberal ideas to current global political arrangements 
than to domestic politics. The approach in this paper is eclectic.  It draws freely 
from what I have called the liberal, republican, and communitarian strands in 
civil society thought.  A critic might very well object that it is necessary to take 
sides.  What if the classic liberal freedom of expression is used to attack the 
substantive values underlying communitarian associations?  Or if the transfer of 
tax revenues and public powers to local associations is so extensive as to 
undermine the broader republican solidarities necessary for citizens to act 
nationally?  These are hard questions but they are so unlikely to arise in the near 
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future of the--undemocratic--global realm, that we do not need to address them 
right now.  Liberals and communitarians agree that a certain degree of freedom 
of expression is fundamental; communitarians and republicans agree that it is 
important for citizens to band together in associations to achieve common 
purposes, both local and national, service-oriented and politically contentious.  
These basic elements of a functioning, democratic political order are not firmly 
established in any international system.  It is premature to pick sides.   
 The major hurdle in transposing liberal ideas to international 
organizations is the uneven acceptance, among their nation-state members, of the 
morality of liberalism.  Earlier, I was a bit disingenuous when I claimed that a 
liberal framework for relations between civil society and international 
organizations would not reach within sovereign states to prescribe how political 
life should be organized there.   For citizens and their associations to contribute 
to a more democratic global order, they must themselves subscribe to the liberal 
premises of this imagined order.  If transparency, free speech, and freedom of 
association are to help democratize international organizations, the associations 
that avail themselves of those rights must themselves be established under 
liberal conditions.  The entire exercise would be pointless if the citizen groups 
that took part in contestation were, in reality, just power holders in illiberal 
polities.  The same is true if the promise of local and transnational civil society is 
to be achieved.  The hope must be that by creating opportunities for citizens and 
groups to participate in a liberal political order, even though it is not necessarily 
that of their own state, they themselves will come to subscribe to the tenets 
necessary for the functioning of such an order.  This is explicit in the efforts, in 
international development organizations like the World Bank, to promote the 
growth of local civil society through funding.  This evangelical streak also 
underpins initiatives to impose a liberal set of rights on international 
organizations and to promote transnational associations. The best one can do is 
to acknowledge frankly the liberal ambition and to encourage those who 
disagree to devise other possible, possibly better, ambitions for international 
organizations.   
The different theories of civil society contain important lessons for the 
organization of global political life.  Yet, the political philosophy of civil society is 
also strangely disconnected from the contemporary movement promoting civil 
society participation in global governance.   The theories explain the importance 
of voluntary associations for political life in a democracy, exhort citizens to join 
such associations, and recommend government measures designed to promote 
their preferred forms of voluntary associations.  They advocate more 
opportunities for civil society participation, with the expectation that such 
opportunities will prompt the growth of associations.   But their target is 
associational life free of the state, not the organization of a democratic state.   The 
theories are agnostic as to the political institutions of democracy and the 
appropriate role for private associations in those political institutions.  In other 
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words, the theories do not elaborate a democratic scheme—with particular 
attention to private associations--that might serve as a source of inspiration for 
replacing state-centered international organizations with something else.  Should 
associations demonstrate and write press articles, run election campaigns, lobby 
legislators, sit on government committees, comment on proposals for legislative 
and administrative action, or sue government officials in court?  The political  
philosophy does not address this series of questions.  Yet this is what the political 
debate in the different systems of global governance is all about: how should 
associations outside the state, acting in an integrated, cosmopolitan political 
space, inform public decisionmaking?  For guidance we must look elsewhere. 
The Comparative Law of Democracy 
For inspiration on civil society's place in global governance, we should 
look beyond the political philosophy to the comparative law of democracy.   
Standard constitutional theories focus on elections, legislative assemblies, the 
executive branch, administration, and the judiciary.   The channels—set down by 
law—through which private associations participate in democratic governance 
are largely ignored.  And yet such legal channels have always existed, albeit in 
vastly different forms depending on the democracy.  By analyzing this aspect of 
national democracy, we can begin to think constructively about how to reinvent 
international organizations.   
The constitutions of contemporary democracies follow at least three 
different patterns:  pluralism, corporatism, and republicanism. 103  In pluralism, 
multiple, competing interest groups have numerous opportunities to influence 
policymaking, irrespective of their size or aims, through the legislature, the 
bureaucracy, and the courts.  In corporatism, certain intermediate organizations 
are allowed to influence policymaking because their membership figures or their 
objectives are believed to warrant giving them a special place--alongside 
                                                 
103 See, e.g., Paul S. Adams, Is There a New Century of Corporatism? in NEW DIRECTIONS IN 
COMPARATIVE POLITICS 17, 28 (Howard Wiarda ed., 3d ed. 2002); DAVID HELD, MODELS OF 
DEMOCRACY 197-232 (1996); Arendt Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and 
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Corporatism?, 36 REV. OF POL. 85, 93-94 (1974); GRAHAM K. WILSON, INTEREST GROUPS (1990).  Most 
political scientists distinguish only between corporatist and pluralist systems.  However, some go 
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decisionmaking (pluralism or corporatism) and systems in which interest groups are 
heterogeneous and competitive but generally are not allowed to influence government 
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social consensus). 
Civil Society and International Organizations 
 35 
legislators, bureaucrats, and judges--in making public decisions.104  In 
republicanism, citizen associations enable individuals to engage in the public life 
of the nation through debate and protest, but those associations are not allowed 
to take part directly in making public decisions.   
International policymakers should appreciate that even though their 
historical circumstances are novel, they do not act in a political or institutional 
void in deciding on associational participation.  Their predilections for interest 
accommodation in the global realm are shaped by their experiences in their 
distinct pluralist, corporatist, and republican democracies.  Even more important 
than self-awareness of national bias is what policymakers can learn from the 
different national experiences with interest and identity groups in public life. 
The following sections elaborate on pluralism, corporatism, and 
republicanism by analyzing the constitutions, laws, and regulations of three 
democracies that typify these distinct patterns of interest participation:  the 
United States, Germany, and France.  The ambition of this paper is to speak to 
policymakers, hence the need to enter into the law to understand the 
implications of the different models for global governance.  In exploring these 
legal systems, however, the reader should bear in mind that even in a single, 
national system, the law of interest participation differs among policy areas and 
often departs from the ideal type.  Moreover, my claim is not that only pluralist 
democracy, corporatist democracy, and republican democracy exist.  The world's 
political systems undoubtedly contain many others laws and models of 
democracy.  But three is a good start in bringing to light the different possibilities 
of associational participation in the institutions of global governance.   
The following discussion of the public law of interest accommodation 
also examines the popular theories of democracy behind the law.  Specific 
theories of democracy informed the American, German, and French constitutions 
at their beginnings and related, evolving popular ideas of democracy continue to 
sustain these constitutions.  In other words, public law reflects culturally specific 
norms about how public affairs should be conducted; public law is also 
grounded on certain beliefs as to the consequences for collective prosperity and 
individual well-being of different institutional arrangements, including those for 
associational participation.105   That the comparative law of interest 
accommodation embodies culturally specific norms and beliefs suggests that the 
differences must be taken seriously indeed.  However, that certain beliefs, 
                                                 
104 While most corporatist theorists focus on intermediate associations of capital and labor, the 
corporatist relationship between state and society extends to the associations that have become 
salient in the era of what Ronald Inglehart calls “post-material” values: environmental protection 
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105 See PAUL PIERSON, POLITICS IN TIME: HISTORY, INSTITUTIONS, AND SOCIAL ANALYSIS 38-40 (2004) 
(analyzing relationship between institutions and preferences, identities, and ideologies). 
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although perfectly credible at home, cannot survive the realities of the global 
realm while others can, shows that a principled choice among the competing 
theories can be made for international organizations.  The paper concludes by 
suggesting how this choice might be made.   
Pluralist Democracy 
The United States is the only clear example of pluralist democracy.106  The 
Constitution establishes a fragmented system of lawmaking which guarantees 
interest groups of all kinds numerous opportunities to influence policymaking.107  
Legislative power is shared among the Senate, the House of Representative, and 
the President, each of which is elected by different constituencies and serves 
different terms.  In the lawmaking process, therefore, interest groups have 
multiple opportunities to shape outcomes.108   
When legislation is sent to the bureaucracy for implementation, the law 
continues to afford interest groups a central role in the policymaking process.  In 
the American presidential system of government, administrators are accountable 
to both the President and legislators on Congressional oversight committees and, 
through them, to multiple interest groups.109  Furthermore, the public has a right 
to receive advance notice of rules, give their view on such rules, and receive a 
detailed response to their objections from the administration.110  Because any 
                                                 
106 Although many other western democracies have a multiplicity of interest groups that are not 
organized into peak associations and that compete among one another for influence, their political 
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policymaking.  Among the democracies covered in Arendt Lijphart's overview of political systems 
around the world, it appears that Costa Rica and Columbia qualify as pluralist:  they both score 
relatively high on the interest group measure (2.50), they both are presidential systems (which is 
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the presidential-parliamentary distinction).  See Lijphart, supra note__, at 177, 119, 138.   
107 See GEORGE TSEBELIS, VETO PLAYERS: HOW POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS WORK 78-79, 139-43 (2002) 
(describing fragmentation caused by American presidential and federalist system of government).  
For the sake of brevity, this paper does not cover two other dimensions of political organization 
that can contribute to more or less interest group access to government decisions:  federalism and 
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108 It appears that the relationship between American political parties and interest groups is very 
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study found that American political parties, in contrast with political parties in other democracies, 
can often function as amalgams of interest groups rather than across-the-board vote maximizers.  
See Clive S. Thomas, Toward a Systematic Understanding of Party-Group Relations in Liberal 
Democracies, in POLITICAL PARTIES AND INTEREST GROUPS  286-88 (Clive S. Thomas ed., 2001). 
109 See ROBERT D. COOTER, THE STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION 158 (describing system of  “multiple 
principals” under U.S. Constitution); Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy, supra note__ at 117 (on 
differences between parliamentary and presidential systems of government); JAMES Q. WILSON, 
BUREAUCRACY 257-58 (describing competition between President and Congress for control of 
administration). 
110 See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (setting down requirements of notice and comment rulemaking).   
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individual or interest association may go to court to enforce the right to notice, 
comment, and a detailed explanation of the rule's basis and purpose, the 
bureaucracy heeds the views of all associations, regardless of the association's 
purposes or membership numbers.  Moreover, courts require that administrators 
apply what Thomas McGarity calls "comprehensive analytical rationality" to 
regulatory problems: administrators must conduct a thorough and definitive 
assessment of the costs and benefits of all possible regulatory options before 
choosing the one that best fulfills the statutory mandate, even though such an 
assessment is sometimes impossible in the face of scientific and political 
realities.111  Comprehensive analytic rationality guarantees that the bureaucrats 
will take seriously any objections made by the parties to the rulemaking 
proceeding--including interest groups.    
American law rarely entrusts private associations with public authority.  
Interests and the associations through which they are expressed are considered 
too partial and self-regarding to be able to handle matters of public concern.  
Numerous industry associations set product and processing standards, but they 
generally compete with other industry associations--they do not set "the" 
standard for all the United States.112  Unlike other countries, private associations 
are not empowered by statute or regulation to set standards for the entire 
industry.113  State governments allow organizations of professionals such as 
lawyers, architects, and engineers to set rules of conduct for their members and 
police compliance with those rules.  This regulatory practice, however, does not 
extend beyond professional services to other sectors of the economy.  Thus, local 
chambers of commerce represent the interests of member firms and tradesmen 
but do not assist the state in regulating their members.  This stands in marked 
contrast with France, Germany, and Italy where chambers of commerce are 
entrusted with public functions.114 
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Lastly, the courts are open to all individuals and interest groups to 
challenge statutes as unconstitutional, to complain that agency action violates 
principles of administrative law, and to enforce regulatory statutes against 
private parties when administrative agencies fail to take the lead.115  Although 
legal doctrines such as standing, reviewability, and ripeness are designed to 
preserve legislative and administrative discretion and to limit the litigation 
burden on the courts, the reach of such doctrines is very limited compared to 
other legal systems.116  To take the doctrine of standing in the administrative 
context, litigants must overcome two hurdles before a court will entertain their 
objections to administrative determinations.  Litigants must satisfy the 
constitutional three-prong test of injury:  injury-in-fact; a causal connection 
between the alleged injury and the administrative determination; and the 
possibility of redress through judicial intervention.  Litigants must also show 
that they come "arguably" within the "zone of injury" that the drafters of the 
enabling statute intended to protect.  But notice that the doctrine does not set the 
bar very high.  As long as an individual can prove an economic, environmental, 
or, in some instances, aesthetic interest that is remotely connected to the public 
policy considerations underpinning the statute, she may challenge the 
administrative determination. 
 What are the preferences for public life and the beliefs about the 
consequences of interest accommodation that underpin American public law?  In 
pluralist democracy, particular interests and identities are legitimate.117  In other 
words, citizens wish to express themselves in public life through associations 
that attend to the specific and highly fragmented interests and experiences of 
economics, region, sex, race, age, and so on, and they believe that public life can 
prosper through this form of interest politics.  Engagement in public life based 
on particularistic group affiliations is the premise of the political system.  Yet, at 
the same time, the role of interest groups in exercising public authority is more 
limited than elsewhere.  That is because associations based on interest are 
believed to function simply as conduits through which individual citizens 
express their differences.  Interest associations do not themselves shape and 
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express broader identities.  They do not command the loyalties of their members 
as nations command the loyalties of their citizens.    
The pluralist understanding of interest is rooted in Madison's political 
philosophy.  Madison believed that passion, self-interest, and faction--impulses 
hostile to individual rights and the welfare of the nation as a whole--were 
inevitable among citizens and their elected representatives.  A republican system 
of government would be viable in a country the size of the United States only 
because in such a vast territory a great number of interests would compete 
against and check one another in public life.  The academic study of American 
politics after World War II drew on the Madisonian idea of interests as central to 
public decisionmaking.  Not only did Robert Dahl and David Truman observe 
the role of competing organized interests in persuading government officials to 
allocate resources and enact laws and regulations, they also condoned the role of 
interests in American public life.118  As long as the rules of the game--the 
institutions that decided which interests would prevail at any given point in 
time--enjoyed public consensus and as long as no element of society went 
unrepresented in the interest group fray, the system would flourish.  According 
to Dahl and Truman, politics would be both stable and fair:  no single group 
would be able to secure control over government and use that control to change 
the rules to its advantage.  
The normative vision was explicitly questioned by subsequent 
generations.  Congress and administrative agencies were being "captured" by 
"special interests" rather than representing all interests fairly and neutrally.119  
But the critique operated from a normative frame of reference in which interest 
was still supposed to drive politics, just a more representative, plural set of 
interests.  For citizens in the corporatist and republican traditions explored in the 
following pages, the pluralist understanding of how democracy should be 
organized is literally and figuratively foreign.  Yet this category of thought--
groups based on interest and identity--dominates empirical investigations and 
theoretical analyses of American politics. 
Public complacency in the face of pluralist interest group politics is 
related to a corresponding distrust of elected officials and government 
bureaucrats.  The Constitution splits and shares legislative and administrative 
powers because of the Founders' misgivings as to government by elected 
officials, misgivings which today extend to the bureaucrats of the administrative 
state.  In the view of the Founders, citizens and their representatives were not 
inclined toward public virtue, in marked contrast with the republican tradition of 
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Machiavelli, Rousseau, and Harrington.  Thus, they believed it necessary to 
design an unconventional system of separation of powers.  Legislative and 
executive powers were not allocated to different branches, but rather they were 
spread across both the legislative and executive branches so that one set of 
officials could check the other.120  This checking and balancing was devised in 
response to the Madisonian perception of narrow interest rather than republican 
virtue as the motivating force in democratic politics; today, the system of checks 
and balances is itself a cause of the omnipresence of interest groups in American 
political life.  
Distrust of public officials, in turn, is associated with limited government-
-together with the preferences and beliefs that sustain a system of limited 
government. 
In the system that Madison envisages, the danger is action and the 
safeguard is stalemate, or, as he would have it, balance.  Factious 
interests are to be "broken," "controlled," and "balanced" against 
each other to produce "stability."121  
Interest groups enjoy multiple opportunities to block and stall government 
action.  A government decision like the requirement that a coal-burning power 
plant be fitted with a scrubber represents a number of lost battles:  the energy 
industry unsuccessfully lobbied members of the Senate, the House, and the 
President's administration, failed to persuade the civil servants in the 
Environmental Protection Agency to craft a favorable implementing rule, and 
lost in court.  Because of the numerous opportunities for interest groups of all 
types to participate directly in public decisionmaking, they can check and 
constrain the exercise of public power.  Interest group pluralism is part of, and 
contributes to, a culture of democracy in which limited government is thought to 
be the wisest system of government. 
Corporatist Democracy 
Germany is a classic corporatist democracy.122  The Basic Law establishes 
a parliamentary system of government, meaning that the winner of elections to 
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the parliament (Bundestag) selects the head of the executive branch (Chancellor 
and cabinet).123  The Basic Law follows Montesquieu's classic scheme in dividing 
legislative and executive power between the parliament and the executive 
branch.  However, the combination of parliamentary government and a strong 
party system leads to the concentration of legislative and executive power in one 
set of hands: the coalition of parties that won the elections. 
This constitutional concentration of power enables elected officials to 
filter carefully which private associations will influence lawmaking.124  In 
drafting bills that touch upon issues such as pension reform and unemployment 
benefits, bills that are sent later to parliament for debate and voting, the Ministry 
of Economics regularly consults with peak organizations of management and 
labor.  The same goes for the Ministry of Consumer Affairs and the Federation of 
German Consumer Organisations and the Ministry of the Environment and 
environmental organizations.  Moreover, advisory boards composed of peak 
associations of business, labor, consumers, and environmental groups have been 
established under a variety of sector-specific statutes and ministerial orders.125   
Private associations influence administrative decisionmaking too, but 
again the law restricts access to government officials.  The same constitutional 
concentration of power in the executive branch that enables ministry civil 
servants to consult selectively on proposed legislation also allows them to 
consult selectively on administrative measures.  Likewise, parliamentary laws 
guarantee certain associations, in specific policy areas, the right to participate in 
rulemaking and other forms of general administrative action.   For instance, 
environmental associations certified by federal and state ministries of the 
environment can demand to be heard and to inspect expert evidence in 
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rulemaking conducted by nature conservation authorities.126  The law, however, 
does not create a right, applicable in all policy areas and enjoyed by all 
individuals and associations, to be informed of rulemaking proposals, voice 
objections, and receive a reply as in the American system.  Instead, German law 
draws a strict line between generally applicable rules and individual 
administrative acts (Verwaltungsakt).127  When an administrative decision is 
classified as an "act," the law guarantees individuals extensive hearing rights 
before the administration.  By contrast, when an administrative decision is 
classified as a rule (Rechtsverordnungen or Verwaltungsvorschriften), the law allows 
significant discretion and imposes minimal procedural requirements.128   
In the German system, intermediate associations are not limited to 
influencing government policy decisions.  The law confers upon certain 
associations the power to set rules with ramifications not only for their members 
but also for society-at-large--rules which are backed by the authority of the 
state.129  For instance, a single industry association, the Deutscher 
Normenausschuss (DIN), sets technical product and process standards for all of 
Germany.130  An agreement between DIN and the German government dating to 
1975 recognizes DIN as Germany’s only standard-setting body and as the 
national organization entitled to represent Germany in various international 
standard-setting organizations.131  By adopting DIN standards, firms come into 
compliance with the safety requirements set down in consumer legislation.132  
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127 MAHENDRA P. SINGH, GERMAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN COMMON LAW PERSPECTIVE 63 (2001).  The 
German Administrative Procedures Act does not cover rules.  The only procedural requirements 
are set down in the Basic Law and specific enabling laws.  The Basic Law requires that rules be 
published and that, in certain cases, they be presented to the Bundesrat and/or the Bundestag.  
Moreover, enabling legislation frequently requires the government to lay rules before Parliament.  
See generally, ZIAMOU, supra note__ at 15-18, 194-96. 
128 Both Rechtsverordnungen and Verwaltungsvorschriften are determinations made by the 
administration that legally bind an undefined number of persons.  The difference is that while 
Rechtsverordnungen bind individuals outside the administration, the equivalent of a rule or 
regulation in American law, Verwaltungsvorschriften bind individuals within the administration.  
The latter are primarily orders issued by senior officials and directed at junior civil servants, the 
equivalent of certain types of informal rules in American law. 
129 See Steinberger, Political Representation in Germany, supra note__at 123-24. 
130 See Josef Falke, 3 RECHTLICHE ASPEKTE DER NORMUNG IN DEN EG-MITGLIEDSTAATEN: DEUTSCHLAND 
22 (2000). In 1997, DIN counted 5,734 member firms. 
131 See Harm Schepel & Josef Falke, 1 LEGAL ASPECTS OF STANDARDISATION IN THE MEMBER STATES OF 
THE EC AND EFTA: COMPARATIVE REPORT 76 (2000).   
132 See Schepel &  Falke, supra note__ at 77 (“DIN is given the task to support the Government by 
creating, by means of the elaboration of standards, acknowledged rules of technology that enable 
the reference to standards in legislation.”).  For instance, under the Law on Safety of Equipment 
(Gerätsicherheitsgesetz or GSG) equipment is considered safe and therefore liability-proof under the 
following circumstances:   "The producer or importer of technical equipment may only display or 
circulate goods such that, in accordance with the generally recognized rules of technology as well 
as the labor protection and accident avoidance regulations, the user or third party to its specified 
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The agreement between DIN and the German government imposes certain 
conditions:  consumers are represented in the organization through a five-
member Consumer Council133 and DIN standards must take into consideration 
certain public interest goals.134  Thus, public power comes with state-imposed 
responsibilities. 
As in the United States, associations of professionals such as lawyers, 
accountants, pharmacists, physicians, and veterinarians are entrusted with 
extensive rule-making and rule-enforcement powers over their members.135  In 
Germany, however, this form of regulation also extends to businesses and trades.  
By law, to run a restaurant or any other business, or to work as a painter, builder, 
or in any of the other trades, one must be a member of a local chamber of 
commerce (Industrie und Handelskammer for businesses and Handwerkskammer for 
tradesmen).  If, for instance, a painter is found by his local chamber to have 
breached a service obligation, he can be expelled from the chamber and thus be 
deprived of his livelihood. 
The German collective bargaining regime also gives trade unions and 
employers' organizations public power by putting them in the position of 
deciding matters for workers and employers throughout the economy, not 
simply their members.  Collective bargaining agreements (Tarifverträge) are 
governed by the Collective Bargaining Agreements Act (Tarifvertragsgesetz, 
TVG).136  The Act regulates three components of all collective bargaining 
agreements: entry into the agreement (Abschlußnormen); employment conditions 
(Inhaltsnormen) such as wages, working time, and dismissals; and internal 
obligations (Betriebsnormen) such as workplace bans on smoking and limits on 
workplace surveillance of employees. 137  Thus, collective bargaining agreements 
cover a wide array of matters related to the workplace, not simply wages and 
working time, matters that in the United States are generally regulated by federal 
and state administrative agencies.  Moreover, while, as a general rule, a collective 
bargaining agreement only binds those firms that signed the agreement through 
the intermediary of their employers' association, the Act permits, under certain 
                                                                                                                                     
application is protected against all kinds of risk to life and health, as specified by the manner of its 
particular application."  The DIN standards were quickly recognized by the courts as the "generally 
recognized rules of technology."  See Trumbull, supra note__ at 189-90.  
133 See Falke, supra note__at 183. 
134 See Schepel & Falke, supra note__ at 76; Normenvertrag, art. 1.2 and annotations. 
135 This area of law is called Standesrecht.  The codes of conduct issued by the free professions (Freie 
Berufe) are known as Ordnungen der Berufsstände and violations of the codes are litigated before 
special courts of honor (Ehrengerichte).  See, e.g., Federal Act for Attorneys-At-Law §§ 43 et seq. 
(Bundesrechtsanwaltsordnung  or BRAO). 
136 See Basic Law, art. 9(3); Däubler, Tarifvertragsrecht, 3. AUFL. (1993); Löwisch & Rieble, 
TARIFVERTRAGSGESETZT (2nd ed., 2004). 
137 Collective bargaining agreements apply to all workers in the firm, regardless of whether they are 
members of the trade union.   
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circumstances, the Minister of Labour and Social Order to declare the agreement 
generally binding (allgemeinverbindlich) on all firms in the industry.138 
Turning to the courts, there too German law gives certain intermediate 
associations the right to influence public policymaking.   Unlike American law, 
pre-enforcement challenges to administrative rules are not allowed.  However, 
certain intermediate associations are empowered to enforce public interest 
statutes.139  This form of associational lawsuit is known as a "class action" 
(Verbandsklage) and enables associations to sue in their own right, without having 
to establish that an individual member has legally recognized rights that have 
been injured.140  Verbandsklage have the advantage over individual lawsuits that a 
judicial remedy can be awarded to the entire class of individuals represented by 
the association, not simply the named plaintiffs.  Since the 1940s, local chambers 
of commerce (Industrie und Handelskammer), competitors (Gewerbetreibende), and 
industry associations have had the right to sue businesses guilty of anti-
competitive practices under the Unfair Competition Act.141  The same 
associations, plus trade unions, also have had a long-standing right to sue for 
infringements of various consumer protection laws.142  Then, in the 1970s, a 
number of statutes empowered consumer and environmental groups to bring 
lawsuits enforcing their terms.  Accredited consumer associations with more 
than seventy-five members have the right to sue to obtain injunctive relief under 
the law on misleading advertising and unfair standard contracts.143   In 1979, 
Bremen gave certain environmental organizations the right to sue for breaches of 
the Bremen Environmental Protection Act and, in 1980, the Land of Hesse did the 
same.144   Under the Federal Nature Conservation Act, passed in 2002, 
                                                 
138 Collective Bargaining Agreements Act § 5.   
139 Only when the rule is enforced against an individual or firm does the law recognize an 
"administrative act" (Verwaltungsakt) that prejudices the rights of a party, which can then be 
challenged in the courts by that party. At that point, the party can claim that the rule upon which 
the enforcement action was based is illegal.  Notice, however, that the range of parties that can 
object to the rule is limited by the requirement of an act directed against a specific party, and the 
arguments that can be used to oppose the rule do not include the procedural claims in American 
administrative law, given the lack of a right to participate in administrative rulemaking. 
140Absent such statutory authorization, associations are not allowed to sue on the behalf of their 
members.  A litigant must allege that the administrative act violated his or her own "subject rights." 
See VwGO § 42.2.    
141 Gesetz gegen unlauteren Wettbewerb (Act Against Unfair Competition) § 13.2.2; Köhler and 
Piper, Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb, 3rd ed., Munich 2002, § 13 note 11 (right to sue of  
Gewerbetreibende), § 13 notes 17 & 20 (right to sue of industry associations). 
142 Gesetz zur Regelung des Rechts der Allgemeinen Geschaftsbedingungen (Unfair Contract Terms 
Act) § 22.3.1.2 
143 See Unfair Contract Terms Act § 13.2.1.2; Trumbull, supra note__ at 78,  96.  Since January 1, 2002, 
the Unfair Contract Terms Act has been repealed and has been incorporated into a number of other 
laws.  The provisions on Verbandsklage are now section 3.1.1.2 of the Prohibitory Injunctions Act 
(Gesetz über Unterlassungsklagen bei Verbraucherrechts--und anderen Verstöβen). 
144 See Bremisches Naturschutzgesetz (Bremen Environmental Protection Act) §§43, 44; Hessisches 
Naturschutzgesetz (Hessian Environmental Protection Act) § 36.   
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environmental groups may sue to oppose public and private schemes with 
environmental effects and to contest administrative waivers from the 
requirements of the Act.145 
In corporatist democracy, in contrast with pluralist democracy, the law 
permits only certain associations to take part in day-to-day lawmaking, 
rulemaking, and enforcement.  The law also confers public authority upon those 
same associations.  What are the cultural norms and beliefs that underpin the 
public law of associations in corporatist democracy?  Industry, labor, the 
professions and trades, consumers, and environmentalists are believed to 
constitute society.146  Membership in one of these groups is a matter of identity 
and belonging.  The fabric of the nation has many threads, some that are 
ideological in nature and expressed through party affiliation and elections, 
others that are related to the structure of the market and production of wealth, 
others that are tied to family and community.  In corporatism, when interest 
groups are consulted or when they are allowed to govern, they are conceived as 
acting in the public interest because, on certain matters, they are the public.  
This ideology can be traced to different nineteenth-century and early 
twentieth-century theories of the state and society.  The political scientist 
Philippe Schmitter identified a number of these strands in his now classic 
analysis of modern corporatist practices: the romantic, organic thought of 
Friedrich Schlegel and G.W. Friedrich Hegel; the Social Christian thought of 
Wilhelm von Ketteler, Karl von Vogelsang, Popes Leo XIII, and Pius XI; the 
fascist authoritarian thought of Giuseppe Bottai and Francesco Vito.147  Some of 
the intellectual pedigree is suspect, but then again, some of it is not.  This form of 
interest accommodation has co-existed happily with elections, legislative 
assemblies, and constitutional courts for over fifty years now.  The less fortunate 
ideological origins of the public law of corporatist democracies should not 
prejudice contemporary attitudes towards corporatist forms of interest 
representation. 
A corollary of the idea of intermediate association as building block of the 
nation is the necessity of distinguishing between associations that represent and 
constitute broader identities and those that simply serve as temporary conduits 
for the shifting preferences of individuals.  In corporatist systems, not all 
associations are created equal.  Just because an organization has a charter and 
                                                 
145 See Bundesnaturschutzgesetz § 61. Many of the consumer and environmental associations that 
are given the right to sue also receive large amounts of direct government funding.  This is the case 
for the German Consumer Federation (Vzbv). 
146 Most political science studies of corporatism focus on peak associations of capital and labor and 
their influence on labor market, social welfare, and economic policies.  See Lijphart, supra note __ at 
176.  As new interests have emerged in areas such as consumer protection and the environment, 
corporatist democracies have extended the old patterns of representation to the new forms of 
interest and therefore I include these actors and policy areas as well.   
147 See Schmitter, Still the Century of Corporatism?, supra note__ at  87. 
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members does not mean that it should be allowed to take part in policymaking 
or to set rules for its members, and by implication, all citizens who interact with 
its members.  The organization must satisfy certain conditions before it will be 
recognized as representing broader social identities:  a significant membership, 
recognition from other associations, longevity, and so on.  
The importance that corporatist democracies attach to public identities 
other than nation does not mean that they denigrate the institutions of national 
citizenship.  Although it is certainly true that corporatism has been used by 
authoritarian regimes--Mussolini in Italy, Franco in Spain, and a number of Latin 
American countries--corporatist interest representation is also an important 
feature of established democracies such as Sweden, Norway, and the 
Netherlands.148  Part of why public law permits legislators and administrators to 
select the interest associations that will influence policymaking is because elected 
representatives are trusted institutional actors.  Because of the choice made in 
favor of parliamentary government, the elected officials that head the executive 
branch wield significant powers.   
A strong, elected executive branch that commands a professional 
bureaucracy has a high capacity for action.  Once a choice is made in a general 
election in favor of a party and its platform, government faces fewer obstacles to 
carrying out that choice in corporatist democracy than in the pluralist variety.  
Legislation and implementing measures can be adopted with relative ease, given 
the relationship between coalition parties, the government cabinet, and the 
administration in drafting and shepherding the text through the government 
process.  However, not as great a capacity for state action as in the case of French 
republican democracy, explored below, because of the need to include and 
accommodate important social and economic forces.  Again, the ability to act 
decisively in public affairs and to pursue new policy initiatives is not simply a 
matter of the institutional mechanics of corporatist democracy; it also informs the 
expectations of the citizens who mobilize and organize within the world of 
corporatist democracy.  In this idea of democracy, once officials are elected to 
office, they should be able to be carry out their policy agenda, checked only by 
significant social forces, because those officials are considered representatives of 
the people and, as such, qualified to make the right decisions for the nation.   
Republican Democracy 
In republican democracies, decisionmaking is dominated by the 
institutions of voting, political parties, elected leaders, and specialized 
administration, with little room for private associations.  France is the 
paradigmatic case, although even there interest and identity associations are 
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becoming increasingly influential in day-to-day policymaking.149  Like Germany, 
the origins of the French system are parliamentary.  The Constitution of the Fifth 
Republic, however, establishes a semi-presidential system: a directly elected 
President appoints the Prime Minister, but the Prime Minister must also enjoy 
the support of the party or coalition of parties that wins the elections for 
parliament.150  This might appear to create the possibility of divided government, 
with the concomitant multiple points of access for interest groups.  Historical 
experience, however, has shown that during those periods in which the offices of 
the Prime Minister and the President are held by different parties, the Prime 
Minister dominates.151  The Prime Minister and his cabinet work with an elite, 
professional administration to draft legislation.  Unlike Germany, this 
concentration of legislative power in the hands of the Prime Minister, or the 
Prime Minister and President when they are both of the same party, is used more 
to exclude interest groups, and less to screen them.152  Different ministries with 
historical ties to certain groups may call upon them to comment on draft bills, yet 
the process is less systematic than in the German system.  The law also 
establishes a number of government bodies on which employers' associations, 
professional associations, labor, farmers, consumers, and other groups are 
represented.  These bodies are consulted in the lawmaking process.153  However, 
the influence and pervasiveness of such advisory bodies in public life is less 
significant than in the German case.154 
Rulemaking and other forms of policy implementation follow a similar 
pattern.  Drafting is a matter for the administration, with the exception of those 
cases in which civil servants seek guidance from outside groups because such 
groups are believed to have valuable experience or the issues are thought to be 
politically sensitive.  Some of the same interest group bodies that advise on draft 
legislation also consult on important implementing rules (règlements).  As in 
                                                 
149 Other such democracies are Greece and Malta.  This classification is based on Schmidt and 
Lijphart.  Schmidt groups France and Greece together as "simple polities."  See Schmidt, supra 
note__ at 115.  In Lijphart's analysis, Malta score high on interest group pluralism (indicating that 
historical relations between state and society have not created incentives for interest groups to 
organize into a small number of peak associations) and executive dominance (indicating that the 
numerous interest groups do not have access to public decisionmakers because of the concentration 
of power in the executive branch).  See Lijphart, supra note__ at 138, 177.  I have excluded common 
law countries like the United Kingdom and Australia from this list because, even though they share 
a number of features with France--a strong state that bars extensive interest group participation in 
public decisionmaking,--they do not share the same republican ideology.   
150 See FRENCH CONST., arts. 8 & 20;  see generally Mark Kesselman, France, in EUROPEAN POLITICS IN 
TRANSITION 127 (Mark Kesselman & Joel Krieger eds., 1987).   
151 See Lijphart, supra note__ at 121-22.   
152 See Andrew Appleton, France, in POLITICAL PARTIES AND INTEREST GROUPS 45, 54 (Clive S. Thomas 
ed., 2001) (describing ability of executive branch to control points of access of interest groups 
because of elite status and professional ethos of civil service). 
153 One prominent example is the Social and Economic Council, which, under the Constitution, 
must be consulted on all economic and social legislation.  See FRENCH CONST., arts. 70 & 71.   
154 See Mény, supra note__ at 144-46. 
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Germany and different from the United States, individuals and their associations 
do not have a general right to participate in rulemaking. The law draws a line 
between administrative decisions of general application (acte réglementaire) and 
individualized determinations (acte individual). 155  Only individualized 
determinations are subject to significant procedural guarantees. 
Private associations are also entrusted with regulatory powers, albeit 
with greater government participation than in Germany.  The law authorizes a 
single standard-setting organization, the Association Française de Normalisation 
(AFNOR), to adopt industry standards.  These standards are often incorporated 
in health and safety and consumer protection laws and therefore become legally 
binding.156  AFNOR is composed mainly of sector-specific industry associations, 
but also includes representatives of trade unions, consumer groups, and 
environmental organizations.   In contrast to the German case, the French 
government directly participates in the standard-setting work of AFNOR:  a 
government representative (commissaire du gouvernement) sits on AFNOR’s 
governing board and can initiate new standards projects, comment on proposed 
standards, and veto standards.157  Similar to Germany, the law requires firms to 
join their local chambers of commerce (chambre de commerce), which exercise 
regulatory and disciplinary powers over their members.158  Members of the 
professions must join their national association (ordre), which is responsible for 
drawing up professional codes of conduct (codes de déontologies) and enforcing the 
terms of the code through their governing bodies (Conseil de l'ordre).159 
French law on associational litigation stands somewhere between 
American and German law.  Like the United States and unlike Germany, 
standing (intérêt à agir) to bring pre-enforcement challenges to administrative 
regulations is liberal.160  Associations are normally permitted to sue on the behalf 
of the general interest (intérêt général or intérêt collectif) that they are charged with 
protecting under their by-laws.161  The grounds of review, however, are narrow 
since plaintiffs are not guaranteed procedural rights in the administrative 
process and therefore can only challenge the rule on the substance, not the 
procedure.162  Furthermore, the degree of judicial interference with the 
                                                 
155 See JACQUELINE MORAND-DEVILLER, COURS DE DROIT ADMINISTRATIF 317  (7th ed. 2001);  MARCEAU 
LONG, PROSPER WEIL, GUY BRAIBANT, PIERRE DELVOLVÉ & BRUNO GENVOIS, LES GRANDS ARRÊTS DE LA 
JURISPRUDENCE ADMINISTRATIVE 355, point 7 (14th ed. 2003). 
156 See Schepel & Falke, supra note__ at 71.  
157 See id. at 72.   
158 See Mény, supra note__ at 144-46. 
159 See JOËL MORET-BAILLY, LES DÉONTOLOGIES 99-126 (2001). 
160 See MORAND-DEVILLER, supra note__ at 679.  However, unlike citizens in Germany and the 
United States, French citizens and their associations cannot bring constitutional challenges to 
parliamentary laws.  See Ferejohn & Pasquino, supra note __. 
161 See id. at 679-80. 
162 See id. at 684. 
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government's findings on the substance is not particularly extensive since the 
government is allowed significant discretion in the rulemaking context.163  
 With respect to associational enforcement of public interest statutes, the 
French system also falls somewhere in between the American and German 
systems.  Traditionally, associations were allowed to sue to protect their property 
rights and to represent the legal interests of their members--in common law 
parlance, a claim sounding in tort, contract, or property--but not to vindicate the 
broader public interest goals contained in laws.  Only the public prosecutor was 
recognized as the legitimate spokesman for the public interest.  As one standard 
text on the subject puts it: 
Before, judges did not want to give to groups that were not 
necessarily representative the power to represent the collectivity.  
Generally speaking, they feared that civil actions, brought before 
the courts by single associations, would encroach upon the 
powers of the public prosecutor.164 
Beginning in the early 1970s, however, judicial resistance to associational 
litigation gave way to a more liberal approach and now associations are allowed 
to sue if the interest being vindicated is consistent with their purposes under 
their by-laws (statuts) and as declared to the public authorities.165  Since there are 
requirements, the litigation opportunities are not as significant as in the 
American system.  However, since the requirements are cross-cutting, and not 
tied to particular regulatory statutes, the litigation opportunities are greater than 
in the German system.    
As in the German case, a number of laws also specifically recognize the 
right of associations to litigate in the public interest:  environmental 
organizations, consumer organizations, animal rights groups, and civil liberties 
groups.166  These laws are not always as liberal as the case law.  They can impose 
additional conditions beyond the judicial requirement of registration as a public 
purpose association whose aims are related to the interests being vindicated.  For 
instance, national consumer associations must have at least 10,000 members 
while local associations must have a "sufficient" number of members.167   
Before concluding this overview of the French public law of associations, 
one unusual feature should be noted, an anomaly which suggests a greater 
suspicion of private associations in public life than in the American or German 
                                                 
163 Id. at 261. 
164 See CHARLES DEBBASCH & JACQUES BOURDON, LES ASSOCIATIONS 82 (8th ed. 2002) (my translation).   
165 See DEBBASCH & BOURDON, supra note__  at 83 
166 See DEBBASCH & BOURDON, supra note__ , at 83-84.  
167 Loi no. 88-14 du 5 janvier 1988 (Loi relative aux actions en justice des associations agréés de 
consommateurs et à l'information des consommateurs), codified at Article R411-1, Code de la 
Consommation. 
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cases.  The French have an unusually elaborate and demanding registration 
scheme for private associations.168  In the 1800s, the Penal Code required that all 
associations with over twenty members obtain authorization from the state or 
face stiff criminal penalties.169  In 1901, the Penal Code provision was replaced 
with a law, which still exists in a substantially modified form today.  That law 
establishes three types of associations, each of which is subject to a progressively 
more stringent form of public supervision:  non-declared, declared, and public 
purpose associations.  Any group of two or more persons can form a non-
declared association without registering with the authorities by adopting a set of 
by-laws to govern their activities.  In the past, such associations were at a 
disadvantage because they could not appear in court to challenge administrative 
acts or enter into contracts; today, non-declared associations generally enjoy 
these basic rights before the courts.  The second type--declared associations--can 
hold property, enter into contracts, and litigate in their own name.  Such 
associations must file certain information with the local prefect170 and must 
maintain a special register in which they note all significant acts of the 
association, to be presented on demand to the authorities.171   
We have already seen the third type of association--public purpose 
associations--in the discussion of associational litigation.  These citizen 
associations are significantly different from the previous two, both in the 
activities they can undertake and the degree of state supervision they undergo.172  
Public purpose associations are entitled to receive donations and bequests and 
may, depending on whether the law sets down additional requirements, bring 
the public interest litigation described earlier.  To qualify, an association is 
required to file an application with the Ministry of Interior.  The decision to grant 
the application is based on a number of criteria: the association pursues the 
general interest (intérêt général); its scope of action extends beyond the purely 
local; it has a significant number of members; it has sufficient resources; and it 
has existed for at least three years.173  Once an association is approved, it must 
                                                 
168 In the United States, associations are generally not required to register with the public 
authorities unless they wish to claim tax-exempt status.  In Germany, voluntary associations 
(Vereine)-- among the most common are sports clubs and singing clubs--are required to register 
with the local court (Amtsgericht), which keeps what is called the Register of Associations 
(Vereinsregister).  Registration confers the association with legal personality, enabling the 
association to enter into contracts, buy property, appear in court, receive gifts and bequests, and 
engage in other legal relations under the Civil Code.  The requirements are minimal: associations 
must have at least seven members and file articles of association that cover certain matters.  See 
GERMAN CIVIL CODE, §§21, 55-79. 
169 See GILLES LEBRETON, LIBERTÉS PUBLIQUE ET DROIT DE L'HOMME 495 (5th ed. 2001). 
170 The prefect is the public official charged with representing the state and administering the law at 
the local level.  See AGATHE VAN LANG, GENEVIÈVE GONDOUIN & VÉRONIQUE INSERGUET-BRISSET, 
DICTIONNAIRE DE DROIT ADMINISTRATIF 239 (3d ed. 2002).   
171 See DEBBASCH & BOURDON, supra note__ at 111. 
172 See LEBRETON, supra note__ at 502.   
173 See DEBBASCH & BOURDON, supra note__ at 40.   
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keep its books and premises open for inspection and it must file annual reports 
with the authorities.174 
The common wisdom among legal scholars is that the original statutory 
scheme was driven by the fear of "the triumph of particular interests over the 
general interest" and the desire to prevent private associations from competing 
with the state.175  The intent was to curb the accumulation of property and power 
outside of the state.  French politics has long since lost this Rousseau-tinted 
hostility towards citizen associations, but the fact of state regulation of such 
associations remains. 
What, then, are the understandings, preferences, and beliefs that sustain 
the republican system of citizen associations in democratic decisionmaking?  In 
republican democracy, the law, through liberal rights of speech and association, 
creates an ample public sphere in which citizens can join together and debate the 
issues of the day.  The law, however, does not afford citizen groups the same 
opportunities to influence legislators, bureaucrats, and judges as in pluralism.  
Like the United States and unlike Germany, interest associations are believed to 
pursue narrow and selfish aims. 176  But unlike the United States, the response to 
this understanding of interest is to exclude private associations from lawmaking 
and administration, to ensure government representation on their regulatory 
bodies, and to screen them before they can appear in court.  The response is not, 
as in the United States, to open the doors of government to all interests so that 
they can check and balance one another.  In republican democracy, no matter 
how many different associations and interests are called to participate in politics, 
they are not believed capable of transcending their particularities and 
constituting the people.   
The French idea of democracy can be traced to the political theory of 
Rousseau as popularized in the Jacobean phase of the French Revolution.  
According to this version of Rousseau, citizens owed their primary allegiance to 
the Republic and had to ratify, directly, all laws of the Republic.  All other 
loyalties were considered illegitimate.177  Obviously, French democracy has 
changed considerably since then.  Yet, through public law and political thought, 
some of the basic principles have survived.178  Citizens do not wish to participate 
in politics through the intermediary of interest groups and interest group elites 
                                                 
174 See id. at 111-12.   
175 See id. at 14-17.   
176 PETER A. HALL, GOVERNING THE ECONOMY: THE POLITICS OF STATE INTERVENTION IN BRITAIN AND 
FRANCE 165 (1986).   
177 See HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, REPRESENTATION, POLITICAL INNOVATION AND CONCEPTUAL CHANGE 
132, 149 (Terence Ball et al. eds., 1989); Michael A. Walzer, Citizenship, in POLITICAL INNOVATION 
AND CONCEPTUAL CHANGE 211, 211 (Terence Ball et al. eds., 1989).   
178 See, e.g., RENÉ CAPITANT, DÉMOCRATIE ET PARTICIPATION POLITIQUE 7-36 (1971) (linking 
contemporary institutions of French representative democracy to Rousseau and contrasting with 
the democratic tradition of Locke).   
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to the same extent as their pluralist cousins.  Nor do they believe that a political 
community in which such interest politics prevail is a viable or good one.  
The smaller role for interest groups in the daily government activities of 
lawmaking, administration, and judging is related to the importance attached to 
the democratic institutions of voting, parties, and elected officials.  At the center 
of the French legal system is not the Constitutional Court but la loi 
(parliamentary statutes) because all citizens are believed to be able to participate 
in their making, either personally or through their elected representatives.179   As 
Article 6 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man says:      
The law is the expression of the general will.  All citizens have 
the right to contribute personally or through their 
representatives to their making. 
Glorification of la loi, like suspicion of interest groups, bears the heavy imprint of 
the French Revolution and the ideal of active citizenship.  It certainly does not 
represent all of contemporary French democratic theory. Yet this understanding 
still informs the types of activities that French citizens value in public life—
voting rather than lobbying.  Moreover, the belief is that if elections and 
parliamentary assemblies were to be downgraded to just one, among many, 
forms of political activity, there would be dangerous consequences for the polity.  
Finally, even more so than corporatist democracy, French citizens inhabit 
a political world in which the state has a high capacity for action.  The ideology 
of la loi is combined today with a strong executive branch characteristic of 
parliamentary systems and a centralized bureaucracy.  In France, the 
government is even more powerful than in Germany, where important social 
and economic interests can delay or stop public policy initiatives, and where the 
Constitutional Court and federalism impose considerable constraints.  Once the 
French Prime Minister and President are elected into office, they can carry out 
their mandate rapidly, free from some of institutional checks that characterize 
the American and German systems. 
My account of republican democracy, even more so than of pluralist and 
corporatist democracy, is highly stylized.  As the French law of citizen 
associations illustrates, even the constitutional system that typifies republicanism 
today departs dramatically from the ideal type and allows private associations to 
influence significantly the daily workings of government.  Yet that does not 
mean that the different law and culture of democracy has been eradicated.  As 
the changing French law of associational standing demonstrates, even though a 
republican democracy might come to permit more associational participation in 
law enforcement, it does so through a uniquely republican set of legal practices: 
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the interest that was considered particular is rendered general through the 
intervention of the state and the recognition that the association serves the 
general interest. 
At the risk of slipping into caricature, the differences that separate 
contemporary democracies on the appropriate role for private associations in 
public life can be summarized as follows.  When an American gazes across the 
Atlantic she sees capture by special interests in Germany, authoritarianism in 
France.  When a German or Frenchman looks in the direction of her American 
cousins, she sees anarchy in which, ultimately, the most powerful economic 
interests prevail.  
The Role for Civil Society in Global Democracy 
 It is time to return to the questions from the beginning of the paper.  
Should the World Bank be required to consult civil society before approving new 
loans?   Should the WTO’s Committee on Trade and the Environment include 
representatives of environmental and other civil society groups?  Should 
associations have a legal right to participate in European Commission 
consultations?   In sum, what should be the role of civil society in a democratic 
system of global governance?   
 The comparative law of democracy shows that each of these questions 
can be answered in at least one of three ways:  all, some, or none of the 
associations between the state and the market can be called upon to participate in 
the institutions of global governance.  Appreciation and tolerance of legitimate 
differences on the civil society question and self-awareness of the inevitable bias 
that comes from being a citizen of one of the many cultures of democracy, is the 
first lesson to draw from this analysis.  But for those wrestling with the issue in 
the global arena, for whom this conclusion is not particularly satisfying, we can 
go one step further.    
One strategy for selecting among the models might be to identify the 
qualities that are essential to any liberal political community and to assess which 
form of interest accommodation best furthers those qualities.  Take equality.  
Liberal institutions should not work to the systematic advantage of certain 
citizens at the expense of others.  But these types of empirical assessments are 
fiendishly difficult.  Take equality in one system—the United States—and in one 
piece of that system-- notice and comment rulemaking.  Mark Seidenfeld and 
Cass Sunstein separately argue that American rulemaking furthers the equality-
abiding ideals of deliberative democracy.  According to Seidenfeld and Sunstein, 
rulemaking serves as a forum for reasoned public deliberation among citizens, 
bureaucrats, and judges.180  Affected citizens put forward their concerns, 
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administrators listen and respond based on the universal grounds of good 
scientific evidence and the enabling statute's overall policy goals, and courts 
oversee the entire process to ensure that the bureaucrats are deciding based on 
public reason.  This procedure stops citizens from putting forward narrow, self-
interested arguments and stops bureaucrats from striking deals that satisfy the 
most powerful participants in the process.   
Not so, argues Thomas McGarity.  American rulemaking in his view 
"works to the advantage of powerful entrenched economic interests."181  Why is 
this the case?  Regulated business is more likely to take part in rulemaking in the 
first place.182  The interest of economic actors is to delay the promulgation of 
rules since the later they must comply, the less they must spend.  Moreover, 
trade associations and firms have the resources necessary to participate 
effectively, resources which are generally lacking in the public interest sector.  
Lastly, the American judges that enforce such procedural rights on judicial 
review impose the demanding standard of "comprehensive analytical 
rationality."  Regulators can rarely meet this standard because they operate in the 
real world of scientific uncertainty, unquantifiable benefits, and practical and 
political difficulties in pursuing certain policy alternatives.   To return to the 
initial point, understanding which law of democracy best advances certain 
liberal goals is no simple task. 
Another strategy for making a principled choice among the different 
models is to compare the feasibility of transplanting them to the global realm.  
Recall that, in the discussion of the public laws of interest accommodation, the 
values and beliefs sustaining those laws were identified.  While it may very well 
be impossible to say whether these popular theories of democracy are right or 
wrong when they operate in the native soil of a national community, we can 
inquire whether their beliefs find support in the empirics of emerging global 
communities.  
Citizens in pluralist democracies value competition among multiple 
interests and identities; they believe that public welfare can emerge from this 
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form of political engagement.  In the global realm, however, it appears that 
commercial interests mobilize more than other types of interests and that citizens 
of northern countries band together in associations more than their counterparts 
in southern countries.  Many observers believe that multinational corporations 
and business lobbies, with their superior financial resources, are better organized 
than public interest groups.183  Similarly, northern NGOs significantly outnumber 
southern NGOs.184  To speak in the language of the pluralist tradition, special 
interest not pluralist competition is the reality of global politics.  Pluralist 
procedures would result in capture by corporate interests and public interests 
from the North.  In the new terrain of global governance, adopting the public law 
of pluralism would fall short of the aspirations of that law.  
Citizens in republican democracies believe that directly elected officials 
should be at the center of public life, with little interference from private 
associations or other institutional actors.  Research on regional and global 
regimes, however, has shown that when power is transferred to the global realm, 
national voters, parties, parliaments, and even leaders of executive branches, lose 
control.185   Regulators and politicians who make decisions in international 
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organizations do so largely free of party and parliamentary oversight.  Under 
these conditions, republican laws and institutions that would permit global 
policymakers to exclude non-state actors could not hope to achieve the ideals of 
representative democracy that underpin such constitutions.  
Corporatist democracy's balance between associationalism and elected 
officials is better-suited to the global politics of today.  Given the separation 
between public officials in the global sphere and voters and elected politicians in 
the national realm, such officials should be required to solicit the views of 
associations.  The case for interest representation in international organizations 
would hold even in the face of a cosmopolitan Global People's Assembly.  A 
directly elected assembly, or a series of such assemblies in specific international 
regimes, would be unlikely to satisfy current understandings of democratic 
representation.  A global assembly's world-wide scale, together with the practical 
limits on the assembly's size, would mean that each legislator would represent 
an enormous constituency.  Such a distance between voters, their representatives, 
and the assembly's collective output would test severely the contemporary 
concept of representative democracy.  Therefore, even a cosmopolitan 
international order--one that served global citizens, not states--would need to 
supplement the public law of French-style republican democracy with other 
institutions.  One possibility would be an elaborate, federalist system of local, 
national, regional, and global assemblies with carefully allocated powers.  
Another is the one explored in this paper--representation of citizens based not on 
territory, but on common interests and identities.  
Representation of interest should follow a corporatist, not pluralist, mold.  
Unlike pluralist democracies, resources are so unevenly distributed in global 
politics that we cannot assume all will be able to mobilize and to compete, 
thereby generating the public good.  As in the corporatist tradition, international 
officials should seek to understand which associations represent significant social 
and economic forces and to take their views into account.  Public officials should 
take pains to ensure balance among those associations that can legitimately claim 
to represent large number of citizens, united by common social and economic 
interests.  Just because certain businesses, in some sectors of the economy, can 
command the profits necessary to organize at the international level, does not 
signify that they should have a special voice in global governance.  The same is 
true for professional advocacy groups that have the skills necessary to apply for 
foundation funding but do not have large memberships.  Not to say that such 
interest groups should be excluded from international policymaking.  Their 
views, however, should be moderated by those of other groups that do not have 
the resources to attend international treaty negotiations, lobby international 
regulatory committees, and file briefs before international tribunals. 
What shape might this form of mediated civil society participation take?  
Let us conduct a thought experiment.  As the reader will recall, the corporatist 
model--illustrated by the German system--enables intermediate associations to 
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participate in policymaking through a number of procedures:  lawmakers consult 
committees of associational representatives; regulatory functions are entrusted to 
industry and professional associations, subject to various public interest 
requirements; public interest statutes are enforced in court by certain 
associations.  For purposes of the thought experiment, let us transpose one piece 
of the corporatist model to one international organization: advisory committees 
of associational representatives to the WTO.  Such committees could be created 
in areas such as manufacturing, agriculture, consumer policy, the environment, 
and development.  One possibility, introduced in the beginning of the paper, is  
Dan Esty’s proposal for an advisory committee on the environment that would 
sit alongside the intergovernmental Committee on Trade and the Environment.  
These civil society committees could be consulted on revisions to the WTO 
Agreements and on interpretations of those agreements.   They could meet with 
government officials about proposals, submit written papers on proposals, and 
publish their reactions to the policies ultimately adopted.  Government officials 
could reject their views but, to the extent that such views were well-
substantiated, at the peril of public opprobium.   
Imagining this form of corporatist interest representation at the global 
level is difficult for a number of reasons, some of which are unique to an 
international setting, others of which are instrinsic to the corporatist model 
wherever it operates.  The most significant conceptual hurdle in making the 
transition from the domestic to the international realm is settling on a system for 
selecting associations.  How would the associations sitting on WTO advisory 
committees be chosen?  The most natural device—giving each state the right to 
appoint a national association—is risky.  Many societies do not recognize 
liberalism's limits on state authority, limits that are vital to the existence of civil 
society.  Such societies are less likely to have interest and identity associations.  
Moreover, illiberal states might appoint associations that represent state 
interests, not independent social actors.  But neither is the solution to give the 
selection task to an official in the WTO secretariat.  The whole point of 
corporatist interest representation is to enable significant social and economic 
forces to take part in public decisionmaking.  What is "significant" cannot be 
decided by a civil servant sitting in Geneva, removed from the complicated social 
realities of different parts of the world.    
One provisional solution would be allow the choice to be made by 
regional organizations: the African Union, the Organization of American States, 
the Association of South East Asian Nations, and others.  Most regions of the 
world contain a number of different regimes, some more liberal than others.  By 
requiring a group of states to come to agreement, the difficulty of creating liberal 
global governance out of illiberal states is reduced somewhat.  Moreover, this 
arrangement has the advantage of giving the choice to government officials 
familiar with the local cultures to be represented.  Politicians and bureaucrats at 
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the regional level should have a better understanding of their social and 
economic realities than civil servants in international bureaucracies.  
Another set of challenges is related to the defects of corporatism 
domestically and the importance of  attempting to avoid such defects at the 
international level.  Again, at the heart of the matter is the selection of 
associations.  At any historical moment, it might be clear which social forces have 
mobilized successfully in democratic politics and hence are entitled to influence 
directly public policy.  But societies change.  The special rights fairly granted to 
certain groups and their associations at one point in time, might become unjust 
privileges at a future point in time.  As citizens develop new interests and 
identities and form new organizations, corporatist systems of interest 
representation can become obsolete.   One oft-cited example of this phenomenon 
is the continuing prominence of blue collar unions in European politics 
notwithstanding their dwindling membership figures.  Furthemore, any system 
that allows private associations to participate in policymaking, even a pluralist 
one, will lend state resources to those associations that succeed in advancing 
their goals through the process.  To avoid these defects, corporatist procedures at 
the international level should be designed to facilitate adaptation and flexibility.  
Every five to ten years, on a staggered basis, regional organizations might be 
asked to review their roster of associations.  And to combat the danger of 
empowering, unfairly, one set of social actors over another set, regional 
organizations could be required to replace some of their associations during this 
periodic review. 
The thought experiment can also incorporate some of the insights of the 
political philosophy covered in the first part of this paper.  In designing WTO 
advisory committees, a number of seats could be reserved for transnational 
associations.  Selecting these associations could be the task of the WTO 
Secretariat.  Its civil servants are particularly well-placed to determine which 
associations are genuinely transnational in their activities and will promote civic 
consciousness across national borders.  To guide the Secretariat, formal criteria 
related to associational size and geographic scope should be devised. 
In designing civil society participation, global policymakers should bear 
in mind that just as patterns of interest representation vary significantly within 
national systems of government, different forms of accommodation might be 
appropriate across international organizations or international policy areas.  For 
instance, certain issues might provoke such extensive global mobilization that 
pluralist institutions are appropriate.  Or national legislatures and executive 
branches might track certain forms of global governance so carefully that it 
might be proper to limit the role of civil society, as in the republican model.  Or 
the public's desire for swift and decisive government action might be such that 
civil society participation should be restricted. 
Conclusion 
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For global politics to become democratic politics, it is critical that citizens 
throughout the world debate and band together on the issues being decided in 
the many sites of global governance. Yet that basic liberal intuition does not 
necessarily support the conclusion that the associations through which citizens 
mobilize should participate in policymaking.  This paper demonstrates that 
liberal theories of civil society advance the cause of specific types of associations: 
local associations with grassroots followings in the social capital and 
communitarian schools of thought and transnational membership associations 
for cosmopolitans.  Ongoing reform efforts in organizations like the World Bank 
and the WTO should pay special attention to these forms of civil society. 
Architects of international organizations can also draw inspiration from 
national experiences with democracy.  Democratic societies have devised at least 
three ways of accommodating interest and identity groups in public life:  
pluralism, corporatism, and republicanism.  Each embodies a specific set of 
values and beliefs about public life.  Proving these popular theories of democracy 
right or wrong in their native soil is not feasible.  It is possible, however, to 
discern whether their belief systems have any purchase on the contemporary 
realities of politics in the international realm.  In a global world of poorly 
organized interests and ineffective electoral politics, the premises of neither the 
pluralist nor the republican models are satisfied.  The laws and institutions of 
pluralist and republican democracy, when transposed to this new global terrain, 
would fall short of the ideals and aspirations of those political communities.  The 
public law of corporatist democracy is a good alternative.  Corporatist 
democracy's belief that a balanced set of intermediate associations should 
participate in policymaking, alongside elected officials and civil servants, is 
better-suited to some of the realities of contemporary global politics. 
 
 
